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This paper deals with the modernization of China's
National Defense sector. After the deaths of two of
China's revolutionary leaders, China launched a program
to improve the deficiencies of its armed forces. This
thesis looks at this new emphasis, focusing on three
different aspects. The first aspect deals with an
examination of the international and domestic deter-
minants surrounding the Chinese conclusion that it had
to modernize its armed forces. This part stresses the
inappropriateness of China's military doctrine in
defending an adversary on a modern battlefield. The
second aspect deals with the role of arms transfers,
stressing the effect this procedure has had on the
equipment, doctrine, personnel, and training of the
military organization in China. The final aspect
covered deals with the effect that modernization of
China's armed forces will have on U.S. relations with
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I. INTRODUCTION
The subject of military modernization in China has
been a controversial one every since the creation of the
People's Republic of China by the Communists in 1949.
This controversy became especially prevalent as a result
of the impact of the Korean War. This experience by the
Chinese revealed the need for a complete metamorphosis
of its army if it was going to "spar" with a modern
military force such as the United States.
Evolving from this experience were two contrasting
schools of thought regarding the method for developing
a new and contemporary fighting force. Both schools
represented an adherence to defensive orientation, and
disagreed only in the manner in which China was to cope
with her weaknesses.
The first school of thought, often referred to as
"the exclusively military point of view" (predominant in
the General Staff) called for a "quick fix" solution.
This view was aptly expressed in the 1950 's by Ye Jianying
when he called for all measures to be directed at continu-
ing to strengthen the People's Liberation Army (PLA)
:
"This is to say, there must be processed a sufficient
quantity of the most modern equipment to arm the Chinese

People's Liberation Army. For the enemy before us is a
well-equipped imperialist army."
As to the means of acquiring these new weapons , Ye
said:
"The equipment of our army today is much
improved compared with the past. But we must
realize that the present stage of industrial
development in our country is still inadequate
for the production of large quantities of the
most modern equipment for our army. This
situation, naturally, is not in keeping with
the needs of modern national defense. To
improve this backward situation, we cannot but
accelerate the development of our industry;
within certain limits, it is necessary for us
to resort to the expedient measure of placing
orders with foreign countries. "2
As stated here, Ye's opinion expressed concern for the
emphasis placed on national defense requirements, and the
continuing development of China's armed forces in terms
of equipment and training.
The second school of thought, held primarily by the
Party, the leaders of the Ministry of National Defense,
and particularly by Peng Dehuai, stressed a position that
subordinated immediate military requirements to long-term
goals, and combined military, political, and economic
factors. Peng's concern was to downgrade the urgency of
interim defense measures in favor of a slower, but fuller,
development of China's industrial production capabilities,
and reliance upon the deterrent capabilities of the Soviet
Union. Peng emphasized his thoughts in a speech favoring
the new Military Service Law:

"... with Large, well- trained reserves and a
sufficient number of reserve officers , with the
material support guaranteed by our growing social-
ist state-owned industry, we can defy aggression by
an enemy. If imperialism dares to launch an
aggressive war against our country, we will be able
on this solid basis, to assemble swiftly an army of
sufficient numerical strength to deal resolute
counterblows and defend the security of our country.
It is precisely in this way that we can, in peace-
time, appropriately reduce the number of military
personnel in active service and save the manpower
and financial resources to be concentrated on a
socialist industrialization which will lay down a
strong technical and economic foundation for modern-
izing our national defense. "3
The new regime in China today, led by both Hua Guofeng
and Deng Xiaoping, has launched a new program of moderniza-
tion notably referred to as the "Four Modernizations."
This program was initially revealed in a speech presented
by Zhou Enlai in 1975 at the Fourth National People's
Congress. Zhou stated the following in that address:
".
. .we might envisage the development of our
national economy in two stages beginning from
the Third Five-Year Plan: the first stage is
to build an independent and relatively compre-
hensive industrial and economic system in fifteen
years, that is, before 1980; the second stage is
to accomplish comprehensive modernization of
agriculture, industry, national defense, and
science and technology before the end of the
century, so that our national economy will be
marching in the front ranks of the world. "^
In 1976, this new quest for modernization took on a
new image following the deaths of two of China's
revolutionary leaders: in January, Zhou Enlai died;
Mao Zedong's death followed in September. An intensive
commitment on the part of the new leadership to improve
10

the deficiencies in the national defense sector of China
followed their passing.
It is the premise of this thesis that China is aware
of the need for modernizing its armed forces; that it
cannot accomplish this by itself; that it will require
arms transfers; and, that it has proceeded to obtain and
buy these arms and technology wherever she could find them.
Finally, it is recognized that China's modernization of
its armed forces has had, is having, and will have a
profound effect on the future course of United States
policy toward China.
This thesis addresses the new emphasis placed on the
military modernization within China by focusing on three
different aspects. First there will be an examination of
the international and domestic determinants surrounding
the Chinese conclusion that it must modernize its armed
forces
.
In Chapter III, the role of arms transfers in China
will be examined: there will be a discussion of subse-
quent effects that arms transfers have had on the equip-
ment, doctrine, personnel, and training of the military
organization in China, and an analysis of the risks and
opportunities facing the armed forces in China will be
covered in Chapter IV.
Finally, an assessment of the likelihood that China
will achieve its modernizational goals will be provided;
11

and an examination of the potential of the Chinese
armed forces and the effect that potential will have
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II. BACKGROUND OF MODERNIZATION
The political leaders of China are attempting now to
rescue the People's Liberation Army (which also includes
the Navy and the Air Force) from the depths of disrepair
after a neglect of more than ten years. This, no doubt,
is a gargantuan task, and to accomplish it successfully
will require that the PLA and its leaders overcome some
severe obstacles and problems which are currently present
within the organization.
An area of concern which must be addressed is whether
the military doctrine and philosophy of China is appro-
priate for the condition of the modern battlefield. Doc-
trines which were adequate in different stages of the PLA's
development are no longer perceived as adequate for China
as a world power. Coupling with this precept is the
resulting change in China's military philosophy. Because
of their importance, these two facets will be the subject
of study in this chapter.
The chapter has been divided into three parts : A) to
establish an operational definition for the term doctrine,
B) to show the evolution of the Chinese military doctrine,
originally defined as "People's War," stressing the con-
flicts which occurred as it changed from a guerilla concept
to the definition as perceived by current leadership, and
14

C) , to show the progressive changes in military philosophy
stressing, 1) the role of the military in China's domestic
structure, 2) the changing views on national defense, 3)
the necessity of a good military image, 4) the perception
of China's contemporary threat, and 5), the establishment
of PLA goals which include the modernization of PLA weapons,
improvement of military training and education, improvement
of the quality of the soldier, and improvement of the
organizational structure.
The Chinese Army, currently listed as the largest in
the world, must maintain a first-rate military doctrine
to serve as the guideline for establishing sound military
policy.
A. DOCTRINE: CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS
1. Definition of Doctrine
One of the problems which historically has been a
stumbling block in the modernization of China's armed
forces is the appropriateness and effectiveness of its
military doctrine. The official military doctrine of
China today incorporates both the politico-military and
military concepts of Mao Zedong.
As defined in a study conducted by Dr. Frank Romance
on the subject of China's military modernization program,
two operative definitions were provided. The first defi-
nition was that found in the Dictionary of Military and
15

Associated Terms (a publication of the U.S. Department
of Defense)
:
Fundamental principles by which military
forces or elements thereof guide their actions
in support of national objectives. It is
authoritative, but requires judgment in
application. *•
The second definition referred to was the official
Soviet definition of military doctrine. Dr. Romance
indicated that because of the early historical association
which existed between the Soviets and the Chinese during
the formative period (1927-1960) this definition perhaps
would be a more applicable description of the Chinese
definition of the term. The Soviet definition states:
A nation's officially accepted system of
scientifically founded views on the nature of
modern wars and the use of armed forces in them,
and also on the requirements arising from these
views regarding the country and its armed forces
being ready for war. Military doctrine has two .
aspects: political and military-technical. The
basic tenets of a military doctrine are deter-
mined by a nation's political and military leader-
ship according to the socio-political order, the
country's level of economic, scientific, and tech-
nological development, and the armed forces combat
material, with due regard to the conclusion of mil-
itary science and the views of the probable enemy.
2
These definitions of doctrine provide a base for
inspection of China's military doctrinal concepts. The
two major concepts maintained by the People's Republic of
China (PRC) today are: 1) People's War, and 2) Wars of
3National Liberation.
2. People's War
The doctrine of People's War is China's answer for
maintaining and defending its homeland. It is their best
16

attempt at providing conventional and revolutionary defense
against a spectrum of attacks.
The principal type of attack on China which was
envisioned by Peking was a sudden attack by long-range
nuclear strikes combined with a massive invasion employing
both nuclear and conventional weapons. Other threats
perceived by Peking included an invasion using conventional
weapons far more advanced than those maintained by the
Chinese forces . The threat China perceives requires that
it maintain a high degree of preparedness. The Chinese
insist upon strong political and ideological preparation
as well as military preparation. Two factors have evolved
as unchanging: the dominance of men and politics.
Early in the development of Mao's military thinking,
"politics represented a great faith in the capabilities
of the mobilized and indoctrinated masses." This
political orientation also represented a belief in the
superiority of the Communist political and economic system
as well as the Maoist principle that "the party commands
the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command
the Party." It was during the Cultural Revolution that
deification of Mao became so prominent that the "thoughts
and principles of Mao" became the "best weapon" -- more
so than artillery, tanks, planes, or even atomic bombs.
This doctrine represents China's "superiority in men
and politics" which was referred to as a "moral atomic
17

bomb." During the 1960's, this meant that strength
through politics was more powerful than nuclear weapons.
This concept maintained that China could not be
defeated by long-range nuclear strikes, even if used in
conjunction with chemical or biological agents. This
doctrine holds that to defeat China, an invasion of the
area by ground forces would be required following an attack.
It then follows that such an invasion would be defeated
by a protracted war whereby the whole population would
mobilize as soldiers, making every factory, school, and
collective farm a combat unit. This tenet of the doctrine
is often referred to as "defense in depth."
The doctrine also calls for trading space for time.
It requires that the Chinese forces lure, or entice, the
enemy to venture deep into the countryside where they
become "bogged down in endless battles" and "drowned in
a hostile human sea." Coupled with this is the belief
that the infantry is still the Queen of Battle, and
modern nuclear weapons cannot be substituted for bravery
on the battlefield. Emphasis is placed on close combat
and night- fighting to neutralize the superiority of men
and politics, and to preserve the morale of the PLA in
light of the fact that they are facing a superior enemy.
In recent years, this strictly guerilla concept incor-
porated in the doctrine has been somewhat modified. While
18

retaining the People's War concept as the basis for its
strategic doctrine, the concept of conventional, posi-
tional-type defense (as recognized by the Western nations)
has been included in their doctrine as a means to protect
their growing industrial and political areas.
3 . Wars of National Liberation
In the 1960's, Peking began to claim that Mao's
military writings held the basic tenets of revolutionary
warfare, and consequently were capable of providing the
foundation for a model of revolution. This model was
felt to be capable of supplying information necessary
for promoting successful revolution outside of China in
Q
such places as Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
As stated in the D1A Handbook on the Chinese Armed
Forces
,
unlike the defensive concept of People's War, this
was an offensive doctrine aimed at gaining and maintaining
9the political power of the target country. However, as
Ralph Powell indicated, military operations are only one
vital element in the overall Chinese revolutionary doctrine
To be successful, such a revolutionary doctrine must encom-
pass and coordinate political, economic, and psychological
policies, as well as military strategy, tactics, and
techniques
.
In support of Wars of National Liberation, the Chinese
neither promise nor provide military aid. While eager to
urge foreign revolutionaries to revolt against superior
19

forces, the Chinese have been less likely themselves to
intervene in major conflicts that would endanger the
security of their own regime. In essence, the emphasis
is directed toward self-reliance as the principal means
of securing victory.
Today, China's military doctrine is based essentially
upon its doctrine of People's War. This doctrine derived
from nearly fifty years of military experience, and incor-
porates concepts conceived by such military strategists
as Sun Tsu, Napoleon, and German and Russian advisors.
The doctrine also provides China with a defense against
a conventional attack or a nuclear attack. It was assumed
that the Chinese forces would be fighting a military organ-
ization which was superior in weapons systems, logistical
support, and manpower. The basic issue, therefore, was
how to survive in such an environment. To accomplish this,
Mao visualized a total war, consisting of the People's
Liberation Army and paramilitary forces , supported by a
mobilized populace conducting a protracted war against
the invading forces
.
When summarized, Mao's doctrine of People's War states:
"When the .enemy attacks, we retreat; when the enemy stops,
12
we harrass; when the enemy retreats, we attack."
Conflicts plagued this strategy early in its develop-
ment—even before the communists secured the government
in 1949. As was pointed out by Dr. Harlan Jencks , an
20

emerging China specialist, Mao's guerillism was "in
eclipse" from December, 1931 until December, 1941.
However, the way was cleared for reemergence of Mao's
13
strategy following two catastrophic military adventures.
One noted in Jenck's study was the "Hundred Regiments
Offensive" which incorporated conventional tactics and met
with little success. The second failure occurred when
the New Fourth Army met with disaster in January, 1941.
Following these two failures, the military strategy of Mao
began to gain more credence and found its proper place
within China's armed forces. By spring, 1945, Mao's mili-
tary philosophy had gained recognition, both militarily
and politically, as evidenced by the expansion of the
regular Red Army to 1, 500,000. 15
The Yenan period, 1945-1949, found philosophy being
somewhat demoted as the military professionals in the
PLA began to assert their military expertise. The tactics
conducted followed the context of a strategy associated
with mobile warfare, and used conventional equipment such
as tanks, aircraft, artillery, etc., with reliance on
more technical expertise. Thus, the Civil War period found
Mao's People's War strategy lacking the support it had
during the early guerilla war period against the warlords
and the KMT. This early competition between the "Maoist"
Cor perpetrators of People's War) and the military pro-
fessionals would become even more controversial as China
21

began to consolidate and develop along the road to socialism
under the new communist regime led by Mao Zedong.
B. DOCTRINAL CONFLICTS
1. Period of Early Modernization, 1949-1956
The Communists came to power in October, 1949.
They no longer had to fight a guerilla war either to stay
alive or to avoid destruction of their organization by
government forces. Their new responsibility was to provide
for the defense of the country, and to maintain law and
order. The experience gained during the Korean War pro-
vided China with the realization that it must modernize
its armed forces.
Beginning with the establishment of the PRC in October,
1949, China's leaders have been confronted with problems
of adhering to this doctrine, or supplanting it to develop
a military policy commensurate with the problems that were
facing its armed forces at the time. It is not the purpose
of this study to cover all of the conflicts which have
evolved over more than a quarter of a century in regard
to the appropriateness of this doctrine. However, some
of the criticisms which have particular relevance to today's
modernization process will be covered.
The situation in China following the Civil War was one
of economic despair. Although recognizing the need for a
strong military force to provide defense, China was in no
position, economically or industrially, to pursue it alone.
22

Thus, after being rebuffed for support from the West,
China immediately turned to the Soviet Union. This
partnership was consummated with the Sino-Soviet Treat/
of February, 1950. 17
The entry into the Korean War by the Chinese in 1950
found certain concepts of the People's War Doctrine losing
ground to that of a more contemporary, modern, and
defensive doctrine which included the concept of a special-
ized, professional army. In an article by Harry Harding,
these changes were credited with occurring as a result of
a desire by the Chinese to emulate the Soviet Union because
18
of experience gained during the Korean War. This war
made a dramatic impression on the military, and it demon-
strated the limitations of their previously successful
guerilla war strategy and tactics.
Recognizing these weaknesses, the Chinese set out to
correct them. As a result, a tremendous drive toward
modernization was instituted with the able assistance of
the Soviet Union. Progress had been made to the point
that the Chinese were advancing from the sole development
of conventional, basic, land armaments (such as small
arms and artillery) to the more sophisticated assembly
of jet fighters (complete construction of light piston
aircraft) and construction of tanks, and of submarine
and small patrol craft. In 1956 the first Chinese
manufactured jet fighters were turned out.
23

By 1954, the Chinese began to see the implications
associated with modern military equipment, especially
nuclear weapons . Chinese leaders were forced to recog-
nize the impact of weapons that they did not possess at
that time. This situation certainly put stress on the




By 1955, the resistance to the pace of modernization
started to lessen, and Chinese military men began to stress
the importance of nuclear weapons and new military tech-
nology. As was pointed out earlier, one of these men, Ye
Jianying, called for a "sufficient quantity of the most
modern material to arm the Chinese People's Liberation
20Army." Others in this same group, Su Yu and Liu Po-
oh' eng, were arguing for a quick- fix of China's strategic
posture with expansion of weapons production, increases
in R 6c D expenditures, large-scale purchases of conventional
weapons, and the transfer of nuclear technology from the
Soviet Union. This group, however, was matched against
another faction consisting of a military-civilian coalition.
Members of this group included such notables as Zhou Enlai,
Liu Shaoqui, Li Xiannian, Chen Yun, and Deng Xiaoping.
They stressed economic development, even though such action
would reduce allocations for the military budget.
2. Period of Soviet Decline, 1956-1960
This conflict was resolved in 1956 with the
24

publication of Mao's report on "The Ten Great Relation-
ships" in April. (Later, this same speech would be repub-
lished and would serve as the catalyst for China's current
Four Modernizations Program.) In the original version,
Mao called for a reduction in military spending, allowing
21those resources to be allocated to economic development.
At this time, the divergent view between the two
competing military factions was (in part) a conflict over
doctrine and over policy: Should Communist China acquire
her own nuclear weapons, or should she depend upon the
assistance of the Soviet Union?
By 1958, this question led to significant policy dis-
putes, which led to further decisions concerning the
development of military doctrine. On 6 September 1958,
the Central Committee of the party adopted a resolution
which followed closely the tenets of Mao's strategy of
22People's War, doctrine, and strategy. In conjunction
with these tendencies, by the end of the Great Leap For-
ward, many of the professional military officers began to
complain about the increased priority given to political
training and community production. Military doctrine be-
came a problem in that the professional military officers
were arguing that material and technological factors were
more important than the human element. Although these
controversies existed, there was no disagreement as to
whether the army should be modernized, only that it should
25

follow a path encompassing traditional Maoist doctrine,
the main tenets being that "man is the main factor in
23
war," and that "politics must take command."
A prominent leader calling for modernization was Peng
Dehuai, the Defense Minister of the PLA. Peng saw the
emphasis on reassertion of People's War as a denigration
of the professional role of the armed forces. A problem
which had serious impact on China's modernization effort
was the attack by Defense Minister Peng against Mao's
political and economic strategy. This outspoken old veteram
of the Long March and the Korean experience had irritated
Mao with his brand of professionalism and modernization
of the PLA, as well as his vicarious attitude toward the
Soviet Union. As a result of his direct attacks against
Mao, Peng was purged as the Defense Minister and replaced
by Lin Biao, a staunch supporter of Mao at the Eighth
Plenum of the Central Committee held at Lushan August
2-16, 1959. This action soon was followed by withdrawal
of Soviet technicians from China leaving her virtually
isolated internationally. This dealt a damaging blow
to modernization of China's armed forces.
3. Period of Self-Reliance, 1960-1967
The sudden cessation of Soviet military and economic
assistance found the PLA unable to pursue their moderniza-
tion program in the manner that was desired. They were
forced to abandon their sprouting new jet fighter
26

production program, submarine program, and medium bomber
program. Also, training was cut back because of attrition
25
of material and shortage of fuel.
These constraints, however, did not dampen the enthu-
siasm of Peng's replacement, Lin Biao. By 1960, Lin had
initiated a modernization effort which gave attention to
domestic roles, but also incorporated the development of
nuclear weapons, and several new machine industries which
stressed development of sophisticated weapons. This mili-
tary policy of incorporating both the military aims and
the political aims of the party was an effort to become
9 A
self-reliant, and it became known as "Walking on Two Legs."
(See Appendix, Chart 1.)
In 1964, Mao began to rely increasingly on the PLA as
a model for the rest of society as evidenced by the "Learn
From the PLA" campaign. This campaign leaned toward the
domestic roles of the PLA.
By 1965, the military professional faction began to
reassert itself. In light of the U.S. activity in Vietnam,
a call for readjusting the priorities and for reallocating
funds came to the forefront again. China's Chief of Staff,
Lo Jui-ch'ing again had called for a crash program of
defense preparations. However, his proposal was opposed,
and eventually Lo was purged because of the effect sucn
27
a program would have on Mao's programs for the future.
27

4. Period of Cultural Development, 1967-1969
In 1967 the PLA became increasingly involved with
domestic duties associated with the Cultural Revolution.
These requirements necessitated the assignment of almost
28
one million men of the PLA to administer the programs.
The PLA influence in politics increased appreciably
in 1969. The Ninth Central Committee found 45% of its
composition being representatives of the military, the
highest ever recorded. In 1971, Lin attempted a coup,
29
and supposedly died in a plane crash. This increase in
domestic functions by the PLA during the Cultural Revolu-
tion caused Mao concern. By 1968, the concern was visable
as steps were taken to bring both the domestic and the
strategic functions of the PLA into better balance. How-
ever, the road leading to improvement and modernization
of the PLA was not yet to be paved with "Golden Bricks"
and traversed by soldiers in "Silver Tracked Tanks."
The road to modernization of the PLA still contained
some pot-holes, some serious obstacles, as represented
by the "Gang of Four" whose ideological views surfaced
causing consternation and delay in promoting the value of
obtaining a modern military establishment with professional
standards. This radical group, deeply involved in the
Chinese media, utilized their position to criticize the
growing trend toward modernization which was in its embry-
30omc stages by 1975.
28

5 . Period of Contemporary Modernization, 1969-Present .
Not until 1976, with the accession of Chairman
Hua Guofeng, Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping, and Defense
Minister Ye Jianying, did the multifaceted issue of mili-
tary modernization return to the forefront of political
issues in China. This new situation was a direct outgrowth
of changed political circumstances in the post-Mao period.
The death of Mao, followed by the fall of the radical
element (the Gang of Four) , erased the barriers which had
checked military modernization for more than a decade.
The new political leadership, together with important
military leaders, called for a rapid improvement of China's
weapons and military equipment on the grounds that the
PLA had fallen behind in the procurement of modern military
31technology.
This new upsurge in support of professionalizing and
modernizing the Chinese armed forces does not necessarily
represent a clear consensus as to the appropriate doctrine
to follow in achieving that goal. Today, there are officers
who are still skeptical about the relevance and appropriate-
ness of Mao's doctrine of People's War to meet China's
defense requirements. To counter, there are those who
advocate gradual modernization. This group intends to
retain the doctrine of People's War because of the
morale-building qualities it has in light of the economic
and technological problems prevalent in China today.
29

C. MILITARY PHILOSOPHICAL CHANGES
1. Role of Military in China's Domestic Structure
The debate over the desired path to follow has
been published in the Chinese press, and discussed in
speeches presented at conferences held throughout China.
On 1 January 1977, the Peking Review republished a speech
which signaled a step-up in seeking to improve the military
capabilities of the PLA. This speech, entitled "On the
Ten Major Relationships," was made originally by Mao in
a meeting of the Politburo in April, 1956. It dealt with
the steps in social revolution and socialist construction.
The third relationship concerned the connection between
economic construction and defense construction. Mao's
precept was that defense construction should follow indus-
trial modernization, and the administrative and defense
budget should be cut from thirty (30) to twenty (20)
32percent.
The exact reason the leadership chose to republish
this speech remains to be seen. It is likely that Hua
sought to use the words of Mao to establish his legitimacy
and to emphasize his concern for strengthening the weapons
and equipment of the PLA. Another possibility could have
been that Beijing recognized the immensity of the problem
and was taking steps to dampen any unrealistic hopes.
Also, it could have been an attempt by the new leadership
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to opt for something less than a forced-draft modernization.
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Whatever the intended purpose of the article, it did
serve to spur on the drive to improve the military capabi-
lities of the PLA. In February 1977, Hua Guofeng held
several conferences in Peking with many of China's military
i
leaders to discuss the direction of this new program. In
a New York Times article, Drew Middleton pointed out that
Hua Guofeng adopted a program whereby China would reorganize
its army into a smaller, more flexible force with more
modern weapons, and with a more centralized command and
control system. The decision by the leadership to follow
this line implies a willingness to abandon the idea that
Soviet invaders would be "drowned" in China's "human sea"
of troops and accept a more modern defensive strategy which
calls for the utilization of more sophisticated modern
weapons by a smaller, better- trained ground, air, and
naval force in the defense of China. Both Hua and Yeh,
according to an editorial in the Liberation Army News
and the People's Daily
,
newspapers of the Communist Party,
called for the army to end the practice of putting poli-
tics ahead of military expertise. Instead, they urged
military men to learn from the "hardbone Sixth Company,
a mobile military unit which adheres to rigid requirements
in training and is always in combat readiness."
In a speech commemorating the Fiftieth Anniversary of
the founding of the PLA on 1 August 1977, Yeh Chien-ying,




"Our army's modernization calls for powerful
ground, air and naval forces and modern arms and
equipment, including guided missiles and nuclear
weapons ; it calls for rigorous training and hard
work to develop a real ability to wipe out the
enemy as required in combat, and mastery of the
techniques involved in handling modern arms and
equipment and of the consequent new tactics.
Workers
,
peasants and intellectuals throughout
China and all PLA commanders and fighters must
seize every moment, race against time and strengthen
the building of the army, the militia and people's
defense, and step up scientific research in national
defense and production by defense indus iries . "35
By early 1978, the new leadership had adopted a national
policy. In his report to the Fifth National People's
Congress CNPC) in February, Hua Guofeng stated that large-
scale military modernization will follow, not precede
economic development. "We must," he said, "take steel as
the key link, strengthen the basic industries, and exert
a special effort to step up the development of the power,
fuel, and raw and semi-finished materials, industries and
transport, and communications. Only then can we give strong
support to agriculture, rapidly expand light industry, and
substantially strengthen the national defense industries.
It should become clear from the above statement that
the modernization of China's military is directly linked
with the modernization of China's economy- -especially the
development of China's technical and scientific capabilities,
the achievement of greater productivity and quality control,
the expansion of such key industries as metals (high
grade metals and alloys) , machine building (modern military
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equipment and armament) , chemicals , fuels , and transporta-
tion. Consequently, the economic objectives of the military
and the new leadership are identical. Whatever the exact
nature of the military modernization may become, the new
leadership is bound to include the increased procurement
of the conventional and advanced weapons systems that can
be produced by China as a result of their new program and
policies for the modernization of China's economy. This
was reiterated in a speech by Hua to the Fifth NPC which
stated: "The national defense industries should put their
production to good account, diligently carry out research
and trial production, and then production of more and better
37
modern conventional and strategic weapons."
2. Changing Views on National Defense
a. Deng Xiaoping, Vice Premier
In February 1980, Deng Xiaoping outlined the
objectives for the nation for the coming decade by identi-
fying three main tasks: first, the nation had to oppose
hegemonism, China's codeword for Soviet expansionism;
second, to realize the unification of Taiwan with the
mainland; and third, to strengthen economic development.
Deng said that of those three, economic development was
the most important since an economically weak China would
not be able to resist Soviet expansionism effectively.
China's leadership intends to be prepared to thwart any
38
action which might develop from the Soviet threat.
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b. Xu Xiangqian, Minister of National Defense
In an article entitled "Strive to Achieve
Modernization in National Defense—in Celebration of the
30th Anniversary of the Founding of the People's Republic
of China," Xu Xiangqian, a veteran commander and politburo
member and the new Minister of Defense, pointed out the
goals in modernizing China's national defense:
".
. .we must gear the modernization of our
national defense to our needs of resisting
foreign aggression and defending our country.
We must develop our weaponry with stress on
the main points and in a planned way. Take
conventional weapons and special weapons for
example. We must lay stress on the develop-
ment of conventional weapons while continuously
developing nuclear weapons and other sophisti-
cated weapons . We are developing nuclear
weapons to break down the nuclear monopoly. We
use them in defense. We do not base our victory
in war on nuclear weapons. With regard to the
development of existing weapons and new- type
weapons, we must first put our footing on the
present foundation, bear in mind our need to
constantly be prepared for war, strengthen and
improve the existing weaponry and increase its
battle efficiency. Meanwhile, we must strive
to develop scientific research in national
defense so this research can anticipate the
defense industry. We must actively design
and manufacture new- type weapons. We must
strive to equip our army with new weaponry
in a considerably short period, improve our
weaponry step -by- step snd make it attain the
advanced world level. "39
3. Necessity of Good Military Image
A set of guidelines produced for the PLA by the
Politburo Department of the Chinese PLA stressed the
importance of maintaining a good image with the people:
"... efforts must be made to conscientiously
study and analyze the new situation and the new
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problems which have cropped up under the new
historical condition with regard to relations
between the army and the government, and
between the army and the people, to carry out
education on the purpose of the army and the
tradition of supporting the government and
cherishing the people in light of the new
situation and the new problem, and to improve
the fundamental attitude of cadres and fighters
toward local government and the people. PLA
units must formulate pacts on supporting the
government and cherishing the people, regularly
carry out activities and set good examples in
observing the policies, laws, and decrees of
the party and the government . "^0
Besides the dispute over the appropriateness of China's
military doctrine, China's leaders are concerned about the
effectiveness and capability of China's forces to meet
the ever- increasing threat to its territorial security.
4. Perception of China's Contemporary Threat
The goals and objectives for China's national
defense are based on the perceived threat the Soviet Union
poses for the security of China. Since the Czechoslovakian
invasion in 1968, the Jin Pao River incident in 1969, and
the Afghanistan intervention in 1979, the Soviet Union has
been deemed China's "Enemy Number One."
Over a period of ten years, the Soviet Union has in-
creased its forces opposite China's borders. Today it is
estimated that the strength of the Soviet Union is some
forty-six (46) divisions, approximately forty- three percent
(437o) of its forces compared to only nineteen (19) divisions
41in the early 1970' s, and eleven (11) divisions in 1968.
This includes substantial numbers of tanks and motorized
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rifle components. The Soviets enjoy a 3:1 superiority in
tanks , and 10 : 1 superiority in armored personnel carriers
.
In 1978, the Soviet Pacific fleet had some seventy (70)
submarines, and sixty-five (65) major surface- combat vessels,
There were substantial air capabilities including the MIG-
25 Foxbat and MIG-23 Flogger, both high-performance, mach-
speed aircraft. They are far superior to anything the
Chinese could muster.
In the nuclear area, Soviet forces have several delivery
vehicles along the border, including MIG-27's and SU-24's,
as well as SS-1 and SS-12 mobile tactical missiles. Nearly
two hundred M/IRBM's have been deployed along the Trans-
Siberian Railway, including some of the new SS-20 IRJBM 1 s
with their MIRV'd warheads. The Soviets also had over
two hundred and sixty SLEM 1 s and four hundred ICBM' s in
the Far Eastern Sector. This certainly represents a for-
midable force; and, at the present time, one with which
the Chinese would have extreme difficulty contending in
42the event of a confrontation between the two powers.
Having looked at the principal threat which faces China,
it is now necessary to examine some of the internal deter-
minants of the modernization program which have generated
concern by Chinese leaders and represent their current
demand for modernization of China's armed forces.
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5. Establishment of PLA Goals
a. Modernization of PLA Weapons
Considering the Chinese experiences in military
engagements over the past 30 years, and the obvious capabilities
of their potential adversaries, China's present military leaders
certainly must appreciate the role modern weapons will play in
determining the outcome of armed conflict in today's modern
battlefield. This appreciation is shown by the inclusion of
the defense sector as one of the four modernizations. Exactly
how this will be accomplished is still problematic.
As stated by Hua in his speech to the Fifth NPC,
"the national defense industries should put their production
to good account, diligently carry out research and trial pro-
duction, and the production of more and better conventional
and strategic weapons." This call for the modernization of
the defense sector by both the military leaders and political
leadership seems to suggest that there is a consensus among
the policymakers on the need to modernize, and that it will
43
require the import of military weapons and equipment.
Closely linked to the theme of weapons modern-
ization has been the resurgence of professionalism. Hsiao
Hua, the Deputy Director-General of the General Political
Department of the People's Revolutionary Military Council,
said in 1952 that the modernization of the army calls for
the mastery of "military science, skillful use of modern
weapons and equipment, strict observance of military
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discipline, and the art of conducting coordinated action
of all branches of the army." He also called for the
training of professional officers in that it is "necessary
to prepare in a planned manner and train cadres who can
master military science." Today, this same need has been
stressed by the military by calling for the attainment of
specialized and complex skills which are necessary to
45operate and maintain complex weapons.
b. Improvement of Military Training and Education
This new emphasis on military training shows
that the death of Mao and the ouster of The Gang of Four
removed a number of constraints which seriously had
hampered the professional advancement of the PLA. The
military officers who experienced the Korean War are strongly
in favor of concentrating their efforts on building a strong
national defense sector and avoiding non-military affairs.
It is their contention today that The Gang of
Four slandered efforts to develop the most advanced national
defense technology saying that "when the satellites go up
into the sky, the red flag would inevitably trail in the
dust." The radicals also contended that "according to its
reactionary logic, we should not have atomic bombs, make
new weapons, or equip our PLA units and militia forces with
new weapons . The only thing that can be done is to do what
our ancestors did: use sharp arrows to cope with an enemy
armed to the teeth."
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Additionally, they declared that any effort to
improve training should be disavowed since it was "advocacy
of the purely military viewpoint and a resurgence of the
bourgeois military line." There also were reports that
indicated that they made a farce of military training.
In an article carried by Chiehfang Ching Pao :
"Consider Chaing Ch'ing, for example.
Bayonet training should aim at hard, accurate,
and fierce blows to the enemy. She said: 'No
good. The movements are ungraceful. ' She forced
all PLA units to learn the movements of theatrical
sword dancers. It would be a total disaster . . .
if all PLA units followed her instructions. "4-8
The new regime led by Hua and Deng has stressed
the importance of military training. The results of this
new emphasis on professionalism are seen in their reports
on the progress of training in the PLA units.
In Shanghai, reports indicate that their PLA
air force units have grasped the control task of education
and training, thereby improving overall combat capability.
This is evidenced by air force regiments fulfilling their
three-year training program one year ahead of schedule.
Anti-aircraft units reportedly have established new records
in live ammunition firing. Also, some 700 units, and some
8,600 individuals were commended for meritorious perfor-
49
mances while fulfilling various combat training tasks.
In Shanghai naval units, similar feats were
recognized in combat readiness training and defense con-
struction. All naval vessels more than fulfilled their
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training mission with over seventy percent (70%) of the
units obtaining ratings of outstanding during live ammu-
nition fire evaluation.
One more example of the accomplishments being
obtained through this renewed emphasis on training is
reflected in an article on a Jinan, Shandong artillery
company. The number one artillery company last year took
only four months to complete the amount of defense construc-
tion work which was originally scheduled for seven and
one-half months. Also, it was credited with establishing
good records in military training, and in raising the
cultural level of commanders and fighters.
In another article reflecting the leadership's
central task of education and training, the Beijing PLA
units were stressing military training. The article
indicated that units engaged in group training, military
exercises with live ammunition, had greatly increased
compared with previous years , and that more training hours
52have been added than had been planned previously.
c. Improvement of the Quality of the Soldier
In conjunction with the new emphasis on mili-
tary training, there has been a revival of specialized
53training of officers in military academies. This new
stress is to enable the officers to acquire the knowledge
necessary to manage a modern revolutionary army.
40

A similar theme was carried in an article in
Chien-fang Ching Pao
. According to the article, a modern
army requires officers with professional training: "offi-
cers cannot be trained with the same methods as those for
soldiers." 54
The supreme policy-making body for the Chinese
armed forces, The Military Affairs Commission, reestab-
lished officer training colleges in all eleven of China's
military regions in an effort to increase the number of
professional officers. Additionally, the two institutions
responsible for producing staff officers were reopened:
The National Staff College for junior ranks, and the
National War College for colonels and above. They had been
closed by Lin Biao during the Cultural Revolution.
In China's "White Papers," the leadership
stressed:
"that in order to meet the needs of
actual war, it is essential to set strict
standards for training and place strict demands
on the army, carry out mass military training
programs in an extensive, down to earth way
. . . it is necessary to run military academies
and schools of all categories well, and to
train command and technical personnel who are
both Red and Expert and capable of carrying out
modern warfare. 56
d. Improvement of Organizational Structure
In addition to better trained soldiers and
officers, the new leadership also is calling for a more
streamlined, more flexible force armed with more modern
weapons. It is the feeling among both British and
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American diplomats in Peking that this new military modern-
ization program eventually will lead to a reduction in the
large military bureaucracy and troop levels.
The implications of the new military doctrine
and the need for new weapons have been restrained by the
ossified generals of the Long March in the policymaking
positions. Up until just recently, China was employing
the oldest generals in the world. The same generals,
were they in the U.S. armed forces, or in the Soviet armed
forces for that matter, would have been retired twenty
years ago. The retention of these officers has, for the
most part, prevented innovation, and has encouraged
stagnation. Reliance on a commanding gerontocracy created
frustrations among the younger up-and-coming professionals.
To eliminate these liabilities, and to secure
capable leadership willing to follow his tenets, Deng
allowed some of his opponents to retire quietly, and
secured draft regulations to ensure the retirement of
58
other aging cadres. This group was the most serious
threat to the new post-Mao leadership. This action,
coupled with Deng's continued emphasis on de-Maoification,
should enable the military to appoint and promote officers
with increased professional competence, thus allowing for
more capable and efficient use of the new military doctrine
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III. ARMS TRANSFER: A PROCEDURE FOR MODERNIZATION
It should be apparent now, after having Looked at some
of the speeches of the new regime that the modernization of
China's armed forces is necessary. Although, at this parti-
cular time there is no indication that China intends to
completely abandon the military principles laid down by
Mao Zedong, there are indications that they were compelled
to make decisions regarding the procedures to be adopted to
accomplish successfully the goals established for the new
moderniz ation
.
One of the procedures they turned to was arms transfer.
The historical role that arms transfers have played in
transforming the PLA to its current position in China will
be analyzed first.
Next, the Chinese procedures to construct an analytical
model for studying arms transfers will be examined. This
examination will establish a definition of arms transfer,
explore the causes and conditions of Chinese policies, and
will stress the particular incentives motivating the Chinese
and the factors restraining the progress of their program.
In an article by Xu Xiangquan, China's Minister of
National Defense, he identified China's weapons as an impor-




"The fast development and extensive application
of modern science and technology have caused
tremendous changes in weaponry. The modernization
has become an integral part of national defense
modernization. To improve and develop our army's
weaponry, we must take our country's current
conditions into consideration and study the
policies and principles we should follow in
modernizing national defense. . . . "1
An examination of the historical role of arms acquisition
•will provide an excellent vehicle by which to judge the impor-
tance of weapons in the up-date of the current armed forces.
A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
During the Revolutionary Period (1927-1949) of the devel-
opment of the Chinese Communist Army, the acquisition of arms
and equipment was very difficult. In Griffith's study of
China's forces at this time, he pointed out that the communist
armies :
"... existed in name only. They were poorly
equipped; machine guns, mortars, and ammunition
were always in short supply. Their only means
of resupply or requisition was through captured
weapons from the enemy- -the KMT and Japanese
. . . the Communists said, 'The Whites supplied
our weapons, our ammunition, horses, radios, and
other equipment and actually delivered them to
us--on the battlefield. 1 " 2





.as late as 1945, a United States military
intelligence report summed up the sorry state of
the communists' military equipment as follows:
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The Chinese communist forces are poorly armed.
Their manufacturing facilities are extremely
limited, and they are forced to depend almost
entirely on captured weapons and equipment.
The communists have a few old and badly worn
artillery pieces, but no artillery ammunition.
Trucks and other mechanized equipment are
destroyed when captured because the lack of
fuel and the lack of trained personnel pre-
cludes their use. No protective equipment is
available against chemical attack, and signal
and medical supplies are insufficient. The
troops, all of whom are trained primarily in
guerilla tactics, depend completely on small
arms and individual close-combat weapons. "3
The acquisition of this equipment from the various sources
was not without some serious problems. Because of the manifold
origins of the equipment, the ammunition needed to operate
the varied types was not the same. The operation of the
equipment also proved difficult because of the training needed
to operate each select piece. It was not until 1948 that the
communists were sufficiently trained to operate the vast
assortment of captured weapons.
By the time of the Communist takeover in 1949, the People's
Liberation Army was equipped with a conglomeration of Japanese
and United States produced weapons, mostly captured from the
Nationalist forces, or given to them by the Soviets. It is
claimed by the Communists that gross capture during the period
from 1946 to mid-1950, was: 3,160,000 rifles, 320,000 machine
guns, 55,000 artillery pieces, 622 tanks, 389 armored cars,
189 military aircraft, and 200 (small) warships.
With the onset of the Korean War, the PLA was still poorly
equipped, armed only with rifles and small quantities of
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automatic weapons. There still was a varied assortment,
and there was little standardization in equipment— or
organization for that matter. This situation proved costly
to the PLA as they sustained heavy losses in light of the
superior equipment used by the U.S., who was soon to become
their principal enemy. This experience quickly led the
Soviets to come to the aid of the Chinese. It is estimated
that the Chinese received about two-billion dollars worth
of military assistance from the Soviets from 1950 to 1951.
The Chinese were compelled to purchase this equipment, thus
incurring heavy debts. The lesson learned, particularly
with respect to the "leash" which was attached, served as
a reminder to the Chinese the liabilities of such a relation-
ship in the future.
The aid, however, led to claims by the Chinese of increased
improvement in their military equipment inventories. The
Russians truly had provided the best equipment they had, and
the improvement was evident. The Chinese Air Force reached
a high standard, and the ground forces were rearmed and re-
equipped. Most of these equipment changes were coupled with
changes in doctrine and organization reflecting the Soviet
influence. This improvement led Zhu De, Commander in Chief
of the PLA, to declare: "The great historic transition of
the PLA from its lower state to its higher stage had begun."
Samuel Griffith added in his account that, "The PLA divisions
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1952 bore little resemblence to its predecessor that crossed
Q
the Yalu in October and November, 1950." This experience
in Korea led the Chinese to appreciate the importance of a
modern, well-equipped force.
By 1955, the changes which had taken place within the
PLA led to debates between those favoring a total moderniza-
tion of the PLA after the model of the Soviet Army, and those
favoring the maintenance of the traditional liberation army.
The first group, referred to as the modernizers , stressed
the need for nuclear weapons and other advanced military
technology; the second group, the conservatives, stressed
the importance of the basic political factors, massive military
manpower, and reliance on eventual development of their own
q
weapons and equipment needs. This debate continued until
the last years of Mao's life, as was pointed out earlier.
(See Appendix, Chart 1.)
It was not until after the deaths of both Mao and Zhou
Enlai in 1976 and the accession of Hua Guofeng and Deng
Xiaoping that a sincere effort was realized to improve the
capabilities of the PLA. A procedure which was sure to play
an important part in this desire was arms transfers. It is
important now to examine the various determinant factors




B. ANALYTICAL MODEL FOR STUDYING ARMS TRANSFERS
Recently a study conducted by Edward A. Kolodziej outlined
a method for analyzing arms transfers. In his study,
Kolodziej looked at arms transfers as a subsystem of interna-
tional relations. He stated that this subsystem is a product
of the interrelations of four sets of actors. These actors
are categorized according to their composition, principal
objectives, and the targets of their activity. They include:
the national, subnational, transnational, and international
actors.
In his study the author deals with the arms transfers
of China on the nation-state or national level. Actors on
this level consist mainly of the ruling elites of the state,
who are charged with defining the exterior relations of the
12
state. "
Kolodziej further states that actor's objectives concern
the goals sought by a particular actor entering into a
particular agreement. These objectives are operationalized
in terms of the desired behavior sought from the targeted
actor. Goals are achieved or advanced according to the
effectiveness of the control or manipulation conducted on
the behavior of the other actor.
Factors identified by Kilodziej as leading to the cause
and conditions for arms transfers were grouped into (from
one to four) subcategories of substantive relations:
strategic, economic, diplomatic or political, and scientific
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or technological. Kolodziej further suggests that there
exists between the different levels of actors a web of real
and perceived interdependencies . He defines such interdepend-
encies as "the effect of one actor's actions (or inaction)
on the behavior of another, whether at the same level of
behavior of another, whether at the same level of action or
13
at another." He further suggests that such effects may
(or may not) be perceived" by the initiating or receiving
actor, or by either of them. Adthough admitting that different
levels of relations can be pointed out as being interdependent,
they do not necessarily have to be viewed by analysts or
perceived by the actors as purposely organized or directed.
These relations may later become relevant in explaining the
rationale behind arms transfers, as those intentionally
14generated by actors.
It also is important to point out that there is not
necessarily a congruence or coherence between actor percep-
tions of the causes and conditions of arms transfers, and
the actual factors which may have led to them. Both such
interdependencies should be accounted for in analysis to
increase our understanding of the need for arms transfers.
Although each of the four actors and four relationships
are present in the arms transfers being conducted in China,
this study will deal primarily with national actors and the
strategic incentives which led China to turn to arms transfers
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as a procedure to follow in the modernization of its armed
forces.
C. STRATEGIC INCENTIVES
One of the main reasons behind the demand for arms in
a given region is to establish a national defense force for
the purpose of providing territorial security. In the case
of China, this desire is manifest in a concern that its
present force structure may not be adequate to protect it
from the growing number of potential adversaries with signi-
ficant amounts of modern weapons. A list which the Chinese
might construct showing these adversaries surely would include,
not only the Soviet Union, but also India, Vietnam, Taiwan,
(and with less emphasis perhaps) North Korea and the United
States. To understand China's apprehensions, it is
essential to have a clear picture of the composition of its
military forces.
1. Current Status of the PLA
The PLA comprises all three of China's armed services,
collectively: Army, Navy, and Air Force. The PLA is esti-
mated to have 4.3 million men and women, of whom approximately
3.6 million make up the Army; 360,000 in the Navy; and 400,000
in the Air Force. It is the largest armed force in the world.
The Chinese ground forces are divided into Main Force (MF)
and Local Force (LF) divisions and formations. The difference
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between these two elements exists mainly in command and
control, and the level of equipment.
The Main Force units are controlled centrally from Peking,
and are available for operations in any part of China.
t
Their mobility was evident during the recent counter-offensive
conducted in February 1979 against Vietnam when a number were
moved to bolster China's forces in that area. Their equip-
ment is better than that of the Local Force divisions, which
are mainly infantry divisions equipped to provide territorial
18defense of the border, or internal defense.
There are a total of 130 MF divisions, of which only
eleven (11) are armored divisions and three (3) airborne
divisions, the remainder being infantry. In addition, there
are forty (40) air defense and other artillery divisions,
and some 150 independent regiments. The armament for all
of the MF's include some 10,000 tanks, consisting of the
T-62 light tank, the PT-76 light amphibious thank, and the
19T-59 medium tank. The LF's have seventy (70) infantry
divisions, and about 130 independent regiments.
The Chinese Navy is essentially an inshore force with
only limited ocean-going capacity. It ranks second in
numbers only to that of the Soviet Union, but most of its
surface vessels are under 100- tons displacement. There
are sixty-eight (68) "Whisky" and "Romeo" class submarines,




The Chinese surface fleet consists of seven (7) "Luta"
class destroyers with STYX surface-to-surface missiles (SSM)
,
four (4) "Gorky" class destroyers with STYX SSM, eighteen
(18) frigates, and nineteen (19) patrol escorts. The STYX
SSM has a range of twenty miles, much less than the Soviet
and Western abroadship missiles. There also are a number
21
of hydrofoil patrol craft.
The air arm of the Navy operates about 700 aircraft in
four (4) bomber, and five (5) fighter divisions. The fighter
units are mainly for air defense and are integrated into the
overall national defense system in the event of war.
The Air Force has some 5,000 craft, and is the third
largest in the world. It is also the oldest, with most of
the aircraft being of Soviet design, which are a generation
or more behind. Their most advanced aircraft is the Chinese
version of the M1G-21, with the remainder of the fighter
force composed of MIG-15,-17, and -19 aircraft. Although
China is working at improving its indigenous aircraft indus-
try (as evidenced by the purchase of Rolls Royce Spey engines
from Britain in 1975, which was to power a new aircraft called
the F-12)
,
it still is hampered greatly by the lack of good
21
metallurgy and jet engine technology.
China's nuclear force consists of the CSS-1 Medium Range
Ballistic Missile (MRBM) , of which there are thirty to forty
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(30-40) with an estimated range of 600-700 miles. It may
well be replaced later by the CSS-2 Intermediate Range
Ballistic Missile (IRBM) of which China now has fifty to
seventy (50-70), with an estimated range of 1,500 to 1,700
miles. The IRBM is capable of reaching Soviet cities east
of the Urals, and Central and Eastern Asia; the MRBM can
strike targets in the eastern part of the Soviet Union.
Chinese missiles are currently liquid- fueled, but solid
propellants are being developed. A limited number of CSS-3
Multi-stage Limited Range Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
(ICBM) are also in the inventory. The Military Balance
currently lists two, with an approximate range of 3,500 miles
which would be capable of reaching European Russia. The only
ICBM in China's nuclear inventory is the CSSX-4. This
missile has the potential of reaching the west coast of the
continental United States. Successful test-firing of this
missile in the South Pacific by the Chinese was conducted
between 18-21 May 1980. U.S. officials felt, however, that
even with an accelerated program, the Chinese could deploy
no more than a few dozen long-range missiles in the next
five or six years. Delivery vehicles for China's nuclear
inventory includes approximately ninety (90) TU-16 intermediate
22
range jet bombers.
To summarize, although numerically the world's largest
armed force, the PLA remains a product of the 1950' s. As
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Western observers have confirmed (most recently, U.S. Defense
Secretary Harold Brown) , the Chinese soldier is physically
fit, highly disciplined, superbly motivated, and well- led;
but, in comparison with soldiers in modern armies, he is
poorly equipped, inadequately serviced, and insufficiently
trained for complex operations. Moreover, the equipment of
the Chinese Army, Navy, and Air Force is no match for the
advanced modern weaponry of the United States and" the Soviet
Union
.
2. New Weapons Procurement
These technological deficiencies, glaringly apparent
to the Chinese, represented a problem for which a solution
was not readily available within China. At this time as well,
a solution to the problem was to be obtained through outside
help, most probably, the "second world."
The solution which the Chinese visualized was one in
which China's knowledge of military and technical interests
would have to be augmented by drawing on foreign knowledge
and experiences. Thus, at the present time, China's
leadership has expressed interest in the introduction of
foreign military equipment. This was expressed aptly in
the 30 July 1978 "White Paper" of China:
".
. . in the present age in which science and
technology are developing by leaps and bounds,
we will be the subject of attack if we do not
have modernized and powerful national defense
and do not master all the weapons as well as the
struggle, tactics, and methods which the enemy
already possesses or may possess. We should
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quickly improve the backwashes of our country's
weapons and equipment. ... It is also necessary
to pay attention to learning from the advanced
experiences of foreign countries, effectively
improve the weapons and equipment of our army,
navy, air force, and militia, and not only have
modern conventional arms and sufficient ammuni-
tion, but also improve the quality of atom bombs,
guided missiles, and other sophisticated weaponry
and equipment. "24
The specific goals for the short-term have not been
publicly announced by Beijing with respect to the modern-
ization of its armed forces. However, there is ample
evidence of the kinds of weapons, equipment, and techno-
logy in which the Chinese have shown an interest. An
article prepared by Angus Fraser lists the types of weapons,
equipment, and technology in which China has expressed
interest since 1 January 1977:
TYPE PERCENT OF SAMPLE
Whole aircraft (26) 34.
1
Anti-tank weapons 17.6
Shelter, nuclear attack 9.5
Anti-submarine warfare gear 7.1
Computers with military applications 5.9
Reconnaissance & communication satellites. 5.9
Anti-aircraft weapons 4.7
Tanks & armored personnel carriers 4.7
Nuclear weapons & missiles 3.6
Naval engines 2.3
Submarines 1.2
Equipment f/ships over 10,000 tons 1.2
Laser applications 1.2
Bridging equipment 1. 2





One can see from an examination of the foregoing list that
more than half of the items focus on defense against an
invader
.
The aircraft sought did not include any long-range
bombers. However, the Chinese did emphasize ground support-
interceptor aircraft ranging from the highly sophisticated
NATO F-16 to the British Harrier VSTOL. The latter was
mentioned most, probably because of its capability for verti-
cal and short takeoffs and landings which would be advanta-
geous in some of the border areas of China. Additional items
dealt with the Chinese need for tactical defense weapons:
anti-tank weapons, anti-submarine warfare, anti-aircraft
systems, and more modern battlefield transport systems.
Some items, such as satellites, naval engines, laser
fire-control systems, and targeting devices, have a dual
26
role and are just as applicable for civilian use. The
United States has just granted purchase privileges to
China recently for the Landsat-D-photo reconnaissance
system which is scheduled for service in 1981. While
having possible military uses, the satellite is not classi-
27fied as a military spy satellite.
In the nuclear area, China's interest remains low key
and appears to indicate a desire to exchange information on
such areas as advanced physics. There has not been much
published concerning their desire to acquire help in the
28production of nuclear weapons.
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This list is not all-encompassing, and what is not on it
may be as important as what is there. It is not possible to
say that the Chinese are not interested in other systems or
activities. It could, however, indicate that these interests
are being carried out quietly. This is not to say that China
is seeking to be supplied covertly by arms suppliers, since
this might create retaliation on the part of the super powers
toward such suppliers. Therefore, it can be said with some
degree of safety, that the Chinese do not have primary interest
in most of the systems missing from the list.
It should be pointed out, however, that at the present
time there have not been many actual purchases. This restraint
by the Chinese may indicate their desire to avoid some of the
pitfalls which other developing countries have experienced in
their effort to modernize and develop a plan which would pro-
vide success for China.
D. FACTORS CONSTRAINING THE ARMS TRANSFER PROGRAM OF THE PRC
Even a cursory listing of the weapons desired reveals the
ambitious extent of the program envisaged. Whether it suc-
ceeds or not will depend upon easily discernible variable
factors.
1. Cost Factor
First of all, the cost would be tremendous to modernize
a force structure as large as that of China. In the tank
category alone, the cost to replace China's present 10,000
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tanks would be on the order of $5-7 billion dollars. If a
commenserate proportion of mechanized infantry, mobile
artillery, and service and combat support were added, the
29investment costs would more than double.
2. Political Factor
The ability of the current regime to carry out its
objectives and goals for the modernization of its military
will depend upon the desires expressed by the ruling group,
and their perceptions of the needs of China. It is for this
reason that Deng is currently insuring that leadership in
the military field accepts the new desire toward greater
emphasis on discipline and professionalization. This new
effort is dramatized by the recent placement of Deng supporters
in the Politburo, and the stepping down of Deng from the
position of Chief of Staff, as well as a reshuffling of the
military region officials.
General Yang Dezhi, an old Korean War veteran hand-picked
by Deng himself, assumed the post of Chief of Staff of the
Chinese Armed Forces, and membership in the Military Affairs
Commission of the Communist Party.
The recent military reshuffling has seen the replacement
of all commanders in China's vital border regions, including
30
the one with the Soviet Union. In Urumgi Military Region,
31the new commander is Xiao Quanfu. Another once purged
veteran to return to command is Ye Fei, a Deng supporter
32
and the new Navy commander. It appears that these new
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shifts are an effort by Deng and other members of the ruling
group such as Tu Shiyou, member of the politburo, to replace
the old Mao PLA which was organized around a guerrilla- led
people's war, with a younger group who places emphasis on
modern technology, military science, and equipment.
3 . Absorptive Capability Factor
Another constraint which will limit China's ability
to achieve its goals of modernization is the absorptive
capacity of its military personnel, the military industrial
complex, and the lack of skilled technicians,
a. Military Personnel
In 1978, Hua Guofeng, the Chairman of the Central
Committee, publicly admitted that it would take a few years
33
to restore the army to its position of prestige and power.
By about 1960, for a period of ten years, the army personnel
had been subjected to training associated with the guerrilla
and revolutionary armies rather than with the more professional
force of the Soviet model.
A new training program was instituted which
ordained that the two basic tasks for the army were "to
increase the political conciousness of all personnel, and to
study Mao-Tsetung writings on military affairs." The
campaign also encouraged the military schools and academies
to make appropriate changes in their training programs . The
schools were required to rewrite military textbooks using
35Mao's doctrine as the guiding light.
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Coupled with the changes in the soldiers training
was the "Officer to the Rank" movement which epitomized the
whole campaign by Mao against professionalism. In this cam-
paign, a directive was issued which ordered all officers
except the aged, the infirm, and the sick to "spend a month
annually in the ranks as ordinary soldiers." The purpose
of this program was to get the officers to experience the
life of a soldier and thus enable them to be a better soldier
and officer in the tradition of perfect unity between offi-
cers and men, superiors and subordinates, soldiers and
civilians." It was emphasized that this program was necessary
for making officers both "red" and "expert."
In conjunction with the officer movement was the
"everyone a soldier" campaign. This too, went against the
grain of the professional officer who did not share the view
that an armed militia could go against a superior armed in-
vader. They preferred, rather, to rely upon a well- trained,
well-equipped standing army. Nevertheless, the task of
training this new militia force fell upon the army--thus
diverting men and equipment away from the army and military
unit training. This type of training and experience con-
tinued until 1971 with the subsequent fall of Lin Biao as
Minister of Defense. It is this type of training atmosphere
that has permeated the military over the years since 1958
up to the modernization under Hua Guofeng, which was
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implemented in the early seventies. The value of profes-
sional skill and ability was subordinate to the politically
"pure" personnel.
Consequently, the personnel who entered the army
during this period have developed good morale, and have
acquired the basic hand-to-hand close combat skills asso-
ciated with a revolutionary army, but they are not educated
nor trained in tactics necessary to fight a war on the
modern battlefield.
This was evidenced in an article by Far Eastern
Economic Review that described a situation which occurred
following the recent country-offensive by the PLA against
its neighbor Vietnam in February 1979. A regiment which
was stationed in Fuj ian Province commented during a discus-
sion session:
"... based on the actual situation of the com-
panies, and in connection with the experiences of
the Sino- Vietnamese self-defensive counter-attack,
they (the members of the regimental party committee)
have boldly reformed their past training methods.
The methods of training infantrymen and artillery-
men together, training fighters and technicians
together, and carrying out training to produce
versatile soldiers have been conducted. "37
The lessons which were learned from the Vietnam
War are being returned to the military schools, and those
who distinguished themselves in combat are being inducted
into the officer corps. In November 1979, one of the
infantry schools located in Fuzhou Military Region took in
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1,600 new students, of whom 1,100 were veterans. During
the welcoming ceremony, the political commissioner of the
region told the new students: "Although you did not fight
against a highly modernized army, it was closer to a modern
38
war than our past wars. The experience was very valuable."
These examples further enforce the lack of train-
ing and experience the soldiers of the PLA had in February,
reinforcing the idea that they would have difficulty using
modern weapons effectively.
b. Military Industrial Complex
China's military industrial complex is backward
and unable to absorb modern technology and equipment. The
Chinese Aero industry is a good example of this backwardness.
This industry is capable of producing its own aircraft such
as the MIG.-19, the mainstay of the PLA Air Force, as well as
the MIG-21, and other varients . However, in the production
of the Shenyang F-7, an unlicensed copy of the MIG-21-F,
which could have been China's present front-line fighter,
problems developed which forced the suspension of production
in 1966. Apparently there was no way to resolve the problem
that had surfaced, thus, only sixty to eighty (60-80) copies
were produced. It was thought that the problems were in the
engine design, particularly the metallurgy technology which




This assumption seemed to be confirmed in 1975
when the Chinese entered a coproduction agreement with Bri-
tain's Rolls Royce Corporation for the purchase of the Spey
39turbo- fan engine. No doubt the Chinese will develop and
design an aircraft which can use this engine effectively.
It will take time, since the Chinese aircraft
industry obviously lacks an R 5c D base, and its production
methods are still in the "middle ages." Many of the
Chinese aircraft components are handmade, and, as a result,
often do not meet standards. Consequently, the power plants,
electronic navigation equipment, metallurgy, and weapons
systems do not meet the standards of advanced weapons of
40the world. Although China is striving to conceal these
deficiencies, it seems that today they are not up to the
task.
This failure of industry is evident also in the
ground forces of the PLA and their equipment. Many weapons
are urgently in need of replacement, and many kinds of
weapons require augmentation.
The Chinese T-50 medium tank is an example.
This tank, although not old, is considered to be China's
main battle tank. It is based on the design of the Soviet
T-54, a 1950 vintage. Thus, it lacks power traverse,
stabilization for the 100-mm gun, and the luxury of a
night infra-red sighting device. It is easy to see that
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any encounter with the Soviet enemy and its new equipment
would cause extreme anxiety on the part of the Chinese troops
The Chinese leaders themselves have more than once admitted
that their equipment lags behind that of Western countries.
This same impression came through during the
recent trip to China by the U.S. Secretary of Defense,
Harold Brown. The Chinese military had put on a demonstra-
tion for him, using elements of the 38th Flight Division
and the 6th Tank Division. After observing the demonstra-
tion, Secretary Brown said:
"What comes through is the pride the Chinese
military has in its duties , and also in its
ability to perform. They are obviously quite
well-trained . . . and the equipment we saw was
well-maintained and capable of performing well.
But, the equipment was not as modern as the
superpowers produce. It corresponds to the
best that the United States and the Soviet Union
had perhaps a dozen years ago."^^-
Such statements by informed military men illustrate the
problem the Chinese industry would have in developing or
maintaining the spohisticated weapons of today.
c. Skilled Technicians
The problems discussed above are a result of
the Cultural Revolution. During this period, technical
education suffered severely because of constraints by
politically-colored policies toward education, lack of
travel abroad by the Chinese, and little exchange of




inventiveness (i.e., cast iron, gunpowder, paper, compass)
is looked upon today as a backward giant.
This decline developed during Mao's last years,
when China's universities were forced to abandon examinations
*
and to accept poorly trained and academically unqualified
students merely on the basis of political recommendations
from factories, communes, and military units. As has been
previously brought out, the slogan of the day was "Better
Red than Expert." The academic books were burned by the
millions , and many teachers and researchers were beaten
and humiliated, some to the point of committing suicide.
Class hours were scheduled more for political study; manual
labor was stressed more than academics. For ten years,
China's massive educational system wallowed in its poli-
tically imposed ignorance, at the cost of a lost generation
of scholars, scientists, engineers, artists, and other
educated persons
.
The results were expressed in an interview con-
43ducted by a Japanese newspaper, Asahi Shimbun . with Chou
Peiyuan, Vice President of the Academy of Sciences in
China. Chou said that today there were only "between
300,000 and 400,000" scientists and technicians, which is
not adequate representation for a country the size of
China. This somewhat gloomy picture was reiterated in a
statement by Fang Yi, Vice President of the Chinese Academy
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of Sciences, who said in 1977 that: "China's science and
education are in such a state that virtually everything
needs to be done." This same tone was repeated when Yi
delivered his report to the National Science Conference
held in Peking during late march and early April, 1978.
At that time he said: "Our country is now lagging fifteen
to twenty years behind in many branches, and still more in
some others."
d. Education
A recent study conducted by the U.S. Office of
Education, which analyzed China's present college entrance
examinations, produced some interesting data on China's
educational system. An analysis of the test showed that
Chinese high school students lag behind their American
counterparts in chemistry, and possibly physics, but are
roughly as well prepared in mathematics. It also indicated
that curricular advances in science and mathematics are a
decade or two behing the U.S., and that the standards of
Chinese students in history and language may be somewhat
lower than they were before the Cultural Revolution.
A spokesman for China's Ministry of Education
indicated that the teachers in college had found the real
standards of general knowledge, and the student's ability




Additionally, it was disclosed that out of 4.6
million students who took the entrance exam, only 270,000
Chinese were admitted to college last fall. Less than 4%
of China's young people are able to go to college as com-
pared with more than 407o in the United States.
China recently disclosed that illiteracy had
increased during the last decade. About 120 million people
under the age of forty-five are now illiterate, according
to the Deputy Minister of Education, Zang Boping. He
indicated that since 1949, the communists had taught 120
million peasants to read and write. He added that 307o of
China's 800 million villages remained illiterate.
Today, China has some 210 million students en-
rolled in educational programs from kindergarten to post-
graduate schools. With college examinations recently
reinstated, only 5 . 87o of those taking them were admitted in
1979. Of all of the Chinese applying for postgraduate
45
studies, only 1.4% were accepted. From these statistics
it would appear that China certainly is not capable of coping
with the problems associated with a modern military modern-
ization at this time. Also, it is apparent that the time
required will be substantial before China will be capable
of solving these problems.
While technological, organizational, and economic
constraints are only amenable to long-term modification,
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political conditions can exert a substantial impact on the
shorter run. The Chinese are acutely aware of inadequacies
in the area of defense, and the dangers connected with rely-
ing on inappropriate defense strategies and technologies.
China's new relationship with the West, parti-
cularly with the United States, seems to indicate that its
new leaders are determined to revise the past diplomatic,
economic, and security arrangements it had long relied upon.
What are the possibilities surrounding a new strategic
realignment? In what area are the interests of the U.S.
and China shared, or parallel? What expectations are pro-
jected in the future with respect to arms transfers between
China and the U.S.? What are the risks and opportunities
associated with advancing the relationship further?
A closer examination of the past and current strategic
interests with regard to U. S.*- Chinese relations should
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IV. SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: ITS RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES
The eyes of the world have focused on the United States
and China following the dramatic signing of the Shanghai
Communique in February 1972, at the conclusion of the
historic visit of (then President) Richard Nixon to Peking.
This development marked an end to an American policy of
twenty years. China had been the target of U.S. efforts
to block the spread of communist influence in Asia. This
new relationship has yet to allay the suspicion and doubt
regarding future relations between these two countries.
To comprehend current issues, this chapter will trace
the history of U.S. interests in China from past issues
and policies to those which have evolved today. The objec-
tive for the historic normalization of relations between
China and the U.S., as stated in a report prepared by
Secretary of State William Rogers, called for "the creation
of a stable peace in Asia, in which the legitimate interests
of all parties will be served."
A. EARLY INTERESTS AND CONCERNS FOR MAINTAINING THE ASIAN
BALANCE OF POWER
Several American foreign policy debates are evolving out
of the new relationship between the United States and China.
One of these debates centers on mutual interests in
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containing the expansion of the Soviets in Asia. The United
States has been concerned over this issue since it recognized
in the late nineteenth century that some basic U.S. security
interests were tied to maintenance of an East Asian power
2balance. This concern grew out of American interest in
protecting China from domination by European or Japanese
imperialism. It further led to the "Open Door Notes" of
1899 and 1900 drafted by an American official, William W.
Rockhill. His interest eventually persuaded both President
William McKinley and Secretary of State John Hay that the
United States should use its new position in Asia, and in
the world, to limit the new power struggle in China. The
purpose of the Open Door Notes was to sustain equality of
economic opportunity within each of the spheres of influ-
ence in China, and to protect it from being dismembered.
At this time, American interests in China were perceived
differently by Government, merchants, and religious insti-
tutions of the United States. The Government considered
China as a large country striving to gain nation status,
and a country quickly becoming the focal point of world
interest.
The merchants saw China as a valuable new market for
United States goods . The thought of adding one inch of




American missionaries visualized opportunities for vast
religious conversions in China because they regarded it as
a country of heathens in need of spiritual enlightening.
Consequently, early interests in China were basically self-
interests rather than a genuine concern for the protection
3
of China as an emerging nation.
Convinced that a strong China would be the best guarantor
of its own independence, the "United States soon became known
as China's protector against European and Japanese imperial-
ism. This image was reinforced by President Wilson, the League
of Nations, and the Nine Power Treaty of the Washington Con-
ference in 1922. It sought to protect China from world imper-
ialism as well as to promote the preservation of China's
sovereignty and territorial integrity.
1. Japanese Expansion into China
In 1930, the Imperial Power of Japan began to stretch
its tentacles into China. These moves were reported in U.S.
newspapers, but concern for internal problems of the United
States outweighed any involvement with China at this time.
By the summer of 1940, the war between Japan and China became
the major concern in Asia of American policymakers. Although
the most immediate national interest seemed to reside in
Europe, the Tripartite Pact of 1940 allied Germany with Japan,
and thus joined Europe and Asia as threats to U.S. security.
The American response became one of military aid which maximized
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Chinese potential to resist Japanese expansionism. However,
in geopolitical terms, this decision was based on an
European- centered notion of world peace.
During the war, the United States continued its efforts
to develop and maintain an effective and stable government
in China. As the end of the war approached, the U.S. became
concerned that the defeat of Japan, and its subsequent with-
drawal, would permit foreign powers (particularly Russia)
to move into the vacuum being created.
Recognizing this threat to our interests, the U.S. sent
an observer mission into Yenan, China in July 1944 to persuade
the Nationalists and Communists to overcome their differences.
It was hoped that such a reconciliation would preserve the
unity of China in the postwar period and prevent the Soviet
Union from developing a position of power in East Asia; and
as such, become a potential threat to U.S. interests. With
the recall of General Joseph Stillwell, U.S. Military Advisor
to Chiang Kai-Shek, in October 1944, the United States
realized that the Nationalists could not provide the support
necessary to safeguard American interests in the face of
expanding Russian influence.
Then in 1945, at the Yalta Conference, the U.S. began to
rely on agreements with Russia to maintain the necessary
stability and balance in Asia. "Specifically, the United
States judged that a balance of power could be maintained
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on the basis of agreement and American-Soviet goodwill,
and that sustained U.S. power politics would not be
required." This new policy was based on the desire of
the United States to maintain a stable situation for future
negotiations with the U.S.S.R. over East Asia.
Following the defeat of Japan, and the start of the
Civil War in China, U.S. policymakers strove to remain as
uninvolved as possible in the conflict between the National-
ists and the Communists. If support were to go to either
side, the preference would have been to the Nationalists.
A few Foreign Service Officers pointed out the damage which
might result to the U.S. national interest if the Chinese
Communists were completely alienated and driven into the
arms of the Russians. However, U.S. spokesman General Hurly
felt that the Chinese Communists were of little consequence
and not capable of controlling China.
Thus, the United States supported Chiang during the
Civil War which inevitably forced the Chinese to move closer
Q
to the Soviet Union. The Chinese Communists defeated the
Nationalists in 1949 and established the People's Republic
of China on the mainland, forcing the Nationalists to with-
draw to the island of Taiwan.
The international situation in the late 1940' s began to
take on some new patterns for the United States. The develop-
ing Cold War in Europe demonstrated that new tactics were
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required to maintain a strategic balance favorable to
American interests. The U. S. could no longer rely upon
Soviet goodwill to bolster stability in East Asia.
By the end of 1940 and early 1950, the Chinese Commu-
nists had swung to the Soviet side by establishing an
alliance which caused the U.S. renewed concern. This
alliance was concluded on 14 February 1950, and was directed
against Japan, or "any other State which should unite with
q
Japan directly, or indirectly, in acts of aggression." Of
course, this last statement referred to the United States.
2. Soviet Support in China
This move by Russia to support China was evidence
that the Soviet Union intended to act unilaterally in their
own interests. This was a diversion from the so-called
framework of cooperation which was to have been followed
under the Yalta agreement. This system, if upheld by the
United States, required a hands-off policy in China. The
Yalta system had postulated a new balance of power in the
Far East, as well as American and Soviet cooperation to
encourage the growth of an independent China. These were
goals which never materialized.
The U.S. determination to limit involvement in internal
affairs in China is apparent in a statement of President Truman
"The United States has no desire to obtain
special rights or privileges, or to establish
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military bases in Formosa at this time. Nor
does it have any intention of utilizing its
armed forces to interfere in the present situa-
tion. The United States Government will not
pursue a course which will lead to involvement
in the civil conflict in China. Similarly, the
United States Government will not provide mili- , ,
tary aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa."
This hands-off view by the United States was main-
tained essentially because the U.S. was following a global
Cold War strategy which placed China under the tutelage of
the Soviet Union. The United States felt that China could
be a launching pad for communist expansion into South and
Southeast Asia. The view in Washington maintained that
China was weak, and did not pose an immediate threat.
On 25 June 1950, Soviet-armed North Koreans crossed
the 38th Parallel and attacked South Korea. In November,
this action was followed by Chinese support provided to the
North Koreans when General MacArthur insisted on driving to
the Manchurian border, thereby posing a serious threat to
the security of China.
This dual-pronged attack served notice to most
Americans that China and the Soviet Union were, in fact, a
threat to the interests of the United States. This caused
a demise of any possibility of a Sino-Soviet disagreement,





This new policy met with wide agreement and resulted
in a network of American military bases (especially those in
Okinawa) , bilateral and multilateral alliances with friendly
or threatened states, and economic and military assistance
programs. Coupled with containment, the United States also
launched an attempt to isolate China by preventing its repre-
sentation in the United Nations, and limiting diplomatic
13
recognition and trade. Aimed at restricting the spread of
the monolithic bloc, the containment policy lasted until 1960
when the myth of the Sino-Soviet pact became apparent.
It is important to note that prior to 1960, there
were several instances which occurred that caused doubt as
to the actual strength of that pact. On various occasions
between 1955-1957, the Chinese attempted to probe the
intentions of the United States toward rapprochement. In
retrospect, the moves appeared to have been Chinese attempts
to gain equality of maneuver from its end of the Soviet
alliance. However, these attempts were not successful,
and received little positive response from the Secretary of
State, John Foster Dulles. Dulles stated on 12 March 1957
that recognition of Communist China would serve no national
purpose, but would strengthen and encourage influences
hostile to us and our allies, and further imperil lands




3. The Soviet "Withdrawal "
Attempts at reconciliation with the United States, as
noted earlier, apparently resulted from an inequality in
relations with the Soviet Union. This suspicion proved true
in 1960 when the Soviets stabbed the Chinese in the back.
Soviet Premier Khrushshev, taunted by the widening
ideological gap between the U.S.S.R. and China, suddenly
called home his technicians, and cancelled all military and
economic support. Consequently, the Chinese were left in an
extremely vulnerable position, with many factories incomplete
and others unable to operate. This act, coupled with restraints
16by the West, forced China into a position of self-sufficiency.
These moves by the Soviets undoubtedly surfaced because
of conflicting views of the two countries regarding current
tactics for strategic and domestic activities. The Soviets
were seeking a cautious, peaceful coexistence, while the Chinese
pushed for a more militant worldwide struggle. In internal or
domestic matters, the Chinese had completely abandoned the
Soviet model, instituting in 1958, their Great Leap Forward
and the commune programs
.
In sum, increased Chinese radicalism in internal
matters paralleled its growing militancy in its foreign
policy. The Chinese focused primary attention on questions
of ideology and revolutionary strategy.
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The developing Sino-Soviet dispute provided U.S.
planners of the 1960's with a potential lever to use against
the Soviet Union in negotiations, and a lever to gain a more
favorable balance of power in East Asia. When John Kennedy
became President, he hinted at resolving some of the problems
with China and moving toward a closer relationship. These
moves did not materialize since Kennedy's administration
enjoyed only a slim margin of support in Congress, who feared
the domestic political costs of dealing with such a sensitive
issue as U.S. -China policy.
American involvement in the Vietnam War served to
solidify the fear on both sides with respect to aggressive
18behavior, and prevented any progress toward reconciliation.
Chinese antagonism toward the U.S. was revealed by Chinese
Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi in a press conference for foreign
correspondents in September, 1965:
"For sixteen years we have been waiting
for the U.S. imperialists to come in and attack
us. My hair has turned gray in waiting. Per-
haps 1 will not have the luck to see the U.S.
imperialist invasion of China, but my children
may see it, and they will resolutely carry on
the fight." 19
Chinese aggression was personified in the 1960's with
its attack on India, and the subsequent support it provided
for the revolutionary "People's Wars" in Africa, Indonesia,
and Vietnam. These actions fed fuel to those critics of
rapproachement with China. One of these critics, Roger
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Hilsman, agreed that Vietnam had to be held to contain Chinese
20
expansion directed toward India. This feeling had earlier
been espoused by proponents of the Domino Theory.
4. Hints of Future Normalization
The antagonistic atmosphere generated by these two
belligerents (U.S. and China) began to diminish toward the
end of the 1960's. It was feared that the Vietnam conflict
would, by spillover, beget a Sino-U.S. conflict. Thus the
two sides, utilizing the Warsaw talks, reached a tacit under-
standing: as long as the United States did not attack the
PRC, the latter would not intervene in Vietnam, and vice
versa. This understanding between two historical adversaries
21provided a hint that further changes might be in the making.
The possible fulfillment of the prognosis indicated
that significant changes lay ahead. In an article appearing
in the October 1967 issue of Foreign Affairs
,
Richard Nixon
said that he felt:
"... that the United States should be dis-
tinguishing carefully between long-range and
short-range policies, and fashioning short-
range programs so as to advance our long-range
goals. Taking the long view we simply cannot
afford to leave China forever outside the
family of nations. . . . The world cannot be
safe until China changes. Thus our aim, to the
extent that we can influence events, should be
to induce changes . ... 22
Surprisingly enough, it was under the Nixon administration
that several events on the international scene took place

which eventually led to the present "Era of Respect" between
the United States and China.
In 1968-69, the clash between the Soviet Union and
China changed from an ideological and political disagreement
to one of military confrontation. After becoming disturbed
about internal events within China (the Cultural Revolution)
and witnessing the acquisition of a Chinese nuclear capabi-
lity, the Soviets began shifting forces to the Eastern border
of Russia. This increasing buildup by the U.S.S.R. , coupled
with their actions in Czechoslovakia, and the new "Brezhnev
Doctrine" of limited sovereignty, caused Peking to revise its
strategy. Peking's action advocated caution, and followed an
28
old Chinese proverb: "Once bitten, twice shy."
By 1969, the danger of a Sino-Soviet confrontation
was confirmed with two subsequent clashes on the Ussuri River
island of Chenapo (Damansky) . Several incidents along the
border followed, as well as cloaked threats by the Soviets
24
at the possibility of a nuclear strike against China. Since
these incidents, relations between the two countries have been
rather chilly, and the military situation has yet to be de-
fused.
On the American side, by 1968, President Johnson had
laid the groundwork for U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. Recog-
nizing the mood of the American people, along with the inten-
sifying global situation, the Nixon administration moved
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forward with improvement of the U.S. -China relations. Most
unexpectedly, in November 1968, Peking called for a Warsaw
meeting to be held on 20 February 1969 for the purpose of
concluding an agreement constructed around the five princi-
ples of peaceful coexistence. However, this meeting did not
reach fruition. The Chinese cancelled in on 19 February
because of diplomatic problems involving asylum for a Chinese
25diplomat. After several queries initiated by Nixon through
foreign intermediaries, the talks were reopened in January,
1970. 26
5 . U.S. Visits to China and the Shanghai Communique
Seemingly convinced that the U.S. was indeed with-
drawing its forces from Vietnam, China agreed to a visit by
the U.S. Table Tennis team in April, 1970--from a stage of
27
uncertainty into an incipient rapproachement. In early
July 1971, Kissinger made a secret visit to Peking. The
secrecy was meant to preserve the respective relationship
of both the U.S. and China on the international scene.
This included the U.S. relationship with Japan, and the
Soviet Union's unstable association with the PPv.C. Primary
topics of discussion at this secret meeting were details
and plans for the upcoming visit of President Richard Nixon
to Peking, which followed in February 1972 and concluded
with the historic Shanghai Communique, the document which
outlined a new formula and framework for future relations
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28between the United States and China.
The essence of the Communique consisted of three
main sections: One stated the agreed position; another
stated U.S. differences, and the last one stated China's
differences. Although the Communique may not have provided
all of the solutions to the problems incurred over nearly a
quarter of a century, nor cement full diplomatic relations
between the two countries , it did "open the road to the
Great Wall," permitting the two countries to begin the
process of normalization.
B. SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP—PRESENT STATUS
Reviewing the events which occurred historically between
the United States and China, we find the most significant
change was the transformation from an extremely hostile
adversary- type relationship to one of military restraint
with economic and cultural exchanges. Granted the latter
two aspects of the relationship are probably better under-
stood, it was the military-security relationship that made
them possible. Though being difficult to explain, the
military-security relationship is derived from parallel
interests. This chapter will outline these parallel
interests and provide some suggestions as to the probability
of the U.S. and China developing, or furthering, a relation-
ship based on military-security ties.
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The security policies of the U.S. have retained suffi-
cent flexibility to respond to the enormous on-going changes
in the international arena. The security issues in East Asia
have been especially conducive to the development of an en-
vironment which allows greater attention to those elements
of possible parallelism or convergence of U.S. -China military-
29
security concerns and interests.
1. Parallel lnterests--Their Development
U.S. security concerns and interests are a direct
response to the increased military presence of the Soviet
Union in Asia. Moscow's move into Afghanistan in December
1979, continued support of Hanoi's aggressive moves into
Cambodia, combined with the increased Soviet naval presence
in Asia have created attention both in Washington and the
friendly capitols of Asia. Both Washington and Peking are
united in their opposition to the Soviets expanding military
presence, and their widening position of power in the Asian's
arena, particularly their current position in Afghanistan.
Another area of parallel interests exists in the
remilitarization of Japan. Neither Washington nor Peking
favor an extensive remilitarization, especially if it means
Japan's acquisition of a nuclear capability. Although the
outcome is the same, the reasons for this parallelism is
quite different. The planners in Washington suspect that a
remilitarized Japan would aggravate the regional balance
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causing destabilization throughout East Asia, perhaps even
weakening the historic U.S. -Japan relationship.
The fear which pervades within Peking stems from
thoughts that if Japan were not tied to the U.S. security
umbilical cord, it might venture into an association with
the Soviets. There is also existant in Peking, the historic
reminder of past adventurism in China by the Japanese.
Both the U.S. and China have combined their influence
in the area, and are seeking to check the expansion of Soviet
influence. The Chinese are, in the long-term, seeking to
discourage the presence of any non-Asian power to remain
in the area. It is pragmatic, though, for the time being,
to encourage the continued presence of the United States to
forego any opportunity that would enable the Soviets to take
advantage of a vacuum left by a U.S. withdrawal from Asia.
Within third world countries, both the United States
and China agreed that "neither should seek hegemony in the
Asia-Pacific region, and each is opposed to the efforts by
any other country, or group of countries, to establish such
30hegemony.' This parallel was pronounced and speciried in
31the Shanghai Communique.
2. Chinese Support of NATO
Additionally, leaders in Peking advocate a strong U.S.
supported North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) , and
enjoin that no compromises between Europe and Moscow be made.
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However, at times Peking has suggested that Europe exhibit
32
more independent action in their dealings with Washington.
In sum, it should be readily apparent that although
there are congruent interests existing between China and
the United States
,
parallelism is found mainly in military-
security problems, while their competition focuses principally
33
on broad, international economic and political issues. It
all stems from the common U.S.-PRC interest in checking the
obvious aggressive, hostile policies of the U.S.S.R.
C. RECENT SINO-U.S. MILITARY AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS
1. Normalization and New Trends
Until 1979, progress being made in the new relation-
ship between the United States and China was marginal at
best. But, with the establishment of "normalization"
between the two countries, led by the Carter administration,
new trends began to develop. They centered mainly upon
economic cooperation, and, in turn, led to the development
of a new vocabulary for use between the two countries
:
assembly, processing, co-production, compensation trade, pro-
duction sharing, establishing a partnership, an equity joint
34
venture, and wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries.
China's foreign trade potential with the U.S. was
stealing the limelight of this new relationship, parti-
cularly following approval by the U.S. Congress in January
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1980, of the Sino-American trade agreement which sanctioned
35
most- favored-nation treatment of China.
This agreement had been sought at the highest levels
in Peking. The Chinese have made no secret of their desire
for U.S. technology and equipment. This desire began to take
on new colors when Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, made
his trip to China from 6-13 January 1980. Although Brown's
trip coincided with the U.S. /Soviet controversy over Cuba,
as well as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, officials in
the U.S. made it known that arrangements for the visit had
been discussed in the Spring, and reinforced during Vice
3fi
President Mondale's visit in August. There were some of-
ficials who felt the trip signalled the Carter admininstra-
tion's concern about the deteriorating international situation
which resulted from a lack of Soviet response. There was also
the fear that the administration was preparing to play its
38
"China Card" against the Soviet Union.
Questions about the China Card brought to the surface
additional concerns about the possibility of Japan, Western
Europe, the United States, and China forming a defense alli-
39
ance to check the Soviet threat to Asian security. The
White House continued to stress that the United States
intended to pursue an even-handed policy toward the Soviet
Union and China. Although this was published policy, know-
ledge of factions within the White House began to emerge.
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Secretary of State Vance's policy to prevent a leaning by
the U.S. toward China was successfully challenged by
National Security Advisor Brezezinski who was sympathetic
towards a Sino-U. S . -Japan United Front— against the advances
of the Soviets into Asia.
A summation of the patterns taking place was aptly
stated in remarks delivered by Vice President Mondale in a
speech on 27 August 1979, during his China visit. He said:
"Any nation which seeks to weaken or
isolate you in world affairs assumes a stance
counter to American interests. This is why
the United States normalized relations with
your country, and that is why we must work
to broaden and strengthen our new friendship.
We must press forward now to widen and give
specificity to our relations . The fundamental
challenges we face are to build concrete
political ties in the context of mutual secur-
ity. . . . Today the unprecedented and friendly
relations among China, Japan, and the United
States bring international stability to
Northeast Asia. "4-0
2. Mutual Security Issues
The mutual security issue really began to stimulate
concern after the leak of a secret Pentagon study in October.
This study fueled the sensitive issue of U.S. arms sales to
China. Although both Secretary Vance and Secretary Brown
continued to reiterate that the U.S. nolicy against selling
arms to China was still valid. These issues created concerns
and questions which prompted hearings and debates regarding
American policy toward China.
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Robert Sutter, a Congressional analyst and Chinese
specialist, indicated in a report discussing this issue, that
the debate stemming from the possible establishment of military
ties with China has apparently become more devisive, conten-
tious, and fractionalized as experts and specialists have
examined it.
An effort has been made to illuminate the risks and
the opportunities which prevail in this issue, and to assist
in determining which policy would be in the best interest of
this country.
3. Countering the Soviet Presence and Arms Transfers
Some arguments which have been proposed by the experts
and specialists should be taken into consideration. The
presence of Soviet soldiers on the Chinese border caused
arguments about their effect on the military balance in
Europe. In the four Soviet "military districts" bordering
China and Soviet Outer Mongolia, there are now forty- six
Soviet divisions (or approximately twenty-five percent of
the Soviet Army's ground forces). The fact that their
forces are located on the Chinese border prevents them
from being utilized in Europe, where they could upset the
equilibrium between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.
There are additional expenses incurred by the Soviets
to maintain these forces in an area which is located far
from maintenance and logistical support supplies.




One should be wary of depending upon such a
situation, even though the experts continue to state
that the dispute is deep-rooted between the Soviets and
Chinese, and tied to cultural, historical, and ideolo-
gical hostilities. Applying an appropriate sports adage,
"A good offense is a good defense," one should realize
that even the most guarded and tactical of detente could
generate a lessening of Russian presence on the Chinese
border, thereby releasing forces for use against NATO.
It is important that we do not rely too heavily on the
present dissension between the two powers.
4. Arms Sales to China--Playing the China Card
Another dimension which has been addressed is the
method of containment of Soviet expansion as a purely mili-
tary one. This agreement revolves around the strengthening
of Chinese forces outright, by supplying them with U.S.
weapons. Another method would be to encourage the Europeans
This latter version has been the policy which the present
administration has continued to uphold.
The advantages to this military dimension revolves
around the comparative advantages for both sides. The
Chinese retain an enormous reservoir of manpower, while
the West retains the industrial and technological base for
weapons production. It thus holds true that a given amount
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of weaponry would only yield a marginal increase in
capability, whereas the same weapons to the Chinese forces
would have an exponential effect. As an example, if the
West were to provide the Chinese Air Force with much needed
air-to-air missiles, a supply of which would upgrade the
capability of the Chinese against Soviet forces, thus
requiring an increase in deployment of Soviet forces to
the East. Of course, as mentioned already, this same
contribution could be made via the advance technology
of the Europeans. This was accomplished in 1975, with the
British SPEY jet engine, which is now being incorporated
into the Chinese Air Force.
Another school of thought for implementing the
"China Card" stresses "diplomatic means," but not neces-
sarily at the exclusion of supplying military equipment.
The strategy which this method proposes is development
of closer Sino-American relations through diplomatic
means, such as the abandonment of the Taiwan Defense
Treaty. This would be incentive enough to get the Soviet
Union to correct the balance of power in the area. For
the West, this would mean, perhaps, a more compromising
relationship to compete with the amity that Peking is
already offering.
Still another approach would be utilization of economic
weapons to facilitate leverage against the Soviets. This
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school of thought stresses the idea that rapid technological
and industrial development by China would provide the
necessary base it needs to develop a significant military
potential. In this instance, the Soviets would be forced
to seek an accomodation with Washington either to assist
the enhancement of China's technological capability, or to
establish themselves in a safe situation for the future,
when China has acquired her rightful place among the
developed nations of the world.
Both these latter methods of implementing the China
Card (the diplomatic and economic) though not necessarily
supporting the geopolitical objective, have been able to
satisfy these objectives of abandoning Taiwan. The logic
of the China Card just discussed does hold, however, and
one must also be aware of the inherent dangers of imple-
menting such a policy. There are those that express concern
for solutions which appear supportive in the short-term and
provide a quick-fix; however, in the long-term represent
bad judgment and perhaps an expensive lesson.
In examining the China Card strategy, the feasibility
of implementing various methods does not present a large
problem. The new pragmatic leadership permits the accept-
ance of such rational actions as they provide enchantment
to China. Therefore, the actual problems arise from the
long-term consequence of the moves.
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The question that comes to mind now is: what would
the Soviet reaction be to such moves? One of the first
reactions by the Soviets would be an assessment of the
threat that such moves would .precipitate. If this assess-
ment proved to be a threatening one , it could produce any
number of possibilities.
For one thing, the Soviets could launch a limited
conventional attack against the border areas of China.
Such an attack would dispel the assumption that China is
able to defend itself. It would also bring embarrasment
to the current regime, because of the inability of the
United States to equip the Chinese adequately due to an
insufficient number of weapons.
It should be evident now from this scenario that
a successful play of the China Card would require more
than just a token deterrent—rather one capable of check-
ing the Soviets. This should immediately bring to the
fore the fallacy of counting on such an "alliance" as a
deterrent since China would scarcely contribute to an
alliance with its present military incapabilities. In
the short-term, such a policy, to some, would not seem to
41be in the best interests of the U.S. to pursue.
5. Assessing the China Card Risks and Opportunities
From this review of the pros and cons of implement-
ing the China Card, one can assess the advantages and
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disadvantages and seek to determine the best policy for the
United States to follow in developing a relationship within
the triangle.
The possible advantages with regard to U.S. interests
occur by developing direct military links, or operational-
izing the China Card, and include:
--Helps the Chinese to strengthen itself against
possible Soviet threats so that it can effectively defend
itself.
--Ties down Soviet forces in the East, diverting
military and other sources away from Europe and the
Middle East.
--Creates uncertainty in Soviets as to the amount
of support the U.S. would be willing to provide China in
the event of a conflict, thereby reducing the use of
military action against China.
--Decreases the threat, enabling the Chinese to
either delete or postpone development of advanced weapons
designed to reach the U.S.
--Prolongs the reestablishment of relations of
rapproachement between the Chinese and Soviets.
--Increases the Chinese stake in the current
relationship, particularly that of the military leaders,
perhaps inducing more constraints or concessions in
dealing with the U.S.
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In addition to some advantages in operationalizing
the China Card, there also are some potentially dangerous
aspects to be considered. Some of the arguments which
have been presented include:
--Reduces the chances for establishing a peaceful
and stable world order by increasing the willingness of
the Chinese to resort to military force to solve their
conflict with the Soviets, or even the Vietnamese.
--Adds additional credence to the Soviet's percep-
tion of collusion by the U.S. and China against them,
causing Soviet paranoia to heighten, Sino-Soviet tensions
to increase, and perhaps increase Soviet pressure on
China overall.
--Increases the liklihood of destabilizing U.S.-
Soviet relations.
--Weakens the relations between the U.S. and Japan
by creating doubt as to the basic priorities of the U.S.
in East Asia.
--Increases latent fears in smaller Asian nations
of a possibly adventuristic China venturing into their
spheres of influence.
--Creates a dependence on the part of the U.S.
which might cause it to be drawn into a Sino-Soviet
conflict in China's behalf (the February 1979 incident




6. Military Cooperation: A Good Investment ?
The arguments just discussed presented the risks
and opportunities involved in operationalyzing the China
Card. An examination of the current developments between
the U..S. and China will help determine the degree of
interaction needed on the question of military cooperation
and provide an assessment as to whether such actions are
in the best interests of the United States.
Developments between the U.S. and China in the
area of military cooperation, and the ensuing policy
dealing with such matters, took a drastic turn following
the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in Decem-
ber 1979. This action by the Soviets called particular
attention to the so-called "even-handed" policy regarding
bilateral relationships between the U. S . -U. S . S . R, and
U.S.-PRC This policy seemed to be dropped and the "tilt"
directed more towards the Chinese.
During Secretary of Defense Harold Brown's historic
trip to China on 6 January 1980, he appealed to the Chinese
leaders to join the United States in finding "complementary
44
actions" to counter such examples of Russian expansion.
This appeal was later followed by an announcement by Brown
in which he said:
"On a case by case basis, we are ready to
consider transfer of technology to the People'
Republic of China that includes civilian and
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military application. The Carter adminis-
tration stands by its refusal to sell
weapons to China, but it has no objections
to allied aid. "45
The progress which was made between the two during
this trip may never be fully known. However, reports indi-
cate that the two sides agreed to exchange military delega-
tions, including a visit by Gen Biao, Deputy Prime
Minister and Secretary General of the Communist Party's
Military Affairs Commission (in other words, Secretary
46Brown's counterpart). This trip took place in May of
this year.
It was apparent that Biao's trip to the U.S. was
certainly directed toward establishing contacts in the
military equipment production area. The itinerary he
followed supports this. He inspected an American Motors
Corporation plant in Indiana which manufactures tactical
47
vehicles for the U.S. Army.
Another plateau reached during the trip which
relates to the transfer of "dual purpose" technology was
the agreement to sell the sophisticated Landstat
surveillance satellite ground station to China. There
also was favorable consideration of other Chinese requests
for advanced technology. The U.S. will continue to limit
U.S. defense sales of non-lethal military support equip-
ment, and certain lines of dual technology items that
have both civilian and military application.
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The arms trade is as tentative as other dimensions
of the China market. For now it would appear that the U.S.
and China are going to focus on only a few areas. Among
these are fixed wing aircraft that can lift both military
and civilian loads, transport helicopters, trucks, recon-
naissance cameras, early warning radar, and other elec-
tronic search and detection equipment.
Significant developments have been made with regard
to military cooperation between the United States and China,
and their development certainly is understandable in light
of our parallel interests— that of countering Soviet
expansion into Asia. But, as spelled out by Harry Harding
in a New York News article, "We must be certain that we
are not acting in a fit of childish pique, but are taking
hard-headed decisions that are in the best long-term
49interests of the U.S." It is obvious that Harding, a
noted sinologist, is perplexed concerning moves being made
to drop the "even-handedness" policy toward one in favor
of the Chinese. This concern is expressed by Harding when
he prescribes a method of providing a more extensive
military relationship with China.
The above method requires that these problems be
considered. First, it is evident that both China and the
United States retain differing views in regard to the
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situation existing in Asia. These views are particularly
manifested in differences regarding the question of Taiwan,
South Korea, and Indochina. Any military aid to China
may come back to haunt us if China's current domestic and
foreign policies were to change. The case of Vietnam in
February 1979 indicates China's will to use military force
if it is necessary to accomplish their intended objectives.
Secondly, using China to act as a counterweight
for the United States would not now be possible because
of the disparity of force between it and the Soviet Union.
According to a recent Pentagon study, it might cost between
$41-$63 billion dollars to give China the necessary means
to defend against a conventional Soviet attack. At this
point in time, neither the United States nor China could
afford it, and China's absorptive capacity is unable to
meet the task.
Finally, a thorough assessment of the values and
effects of a military relationship between the United
States and China on the Soviet Union has not been made.
It may be that the risks are greater than the benefits,
and such a move might work to disadvantage in the long
50
run.
The essence of the Harding article is "caution,"
and this still holds true with regard to establishing a
military cooperation with China. We must be certain that
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a military link with the Chinese is a truly effective way
of protecting our interests against Soviet pressure.
In sum, the military relationship between the
United States and China offers a method of countering
the Soviets in Asia. However, at this time, backing the
Chinese against the Soviet Union could be very risky. It
is widely known that expedients contrived to meet immediate
crises tend to become permanent. Consequently, the current
courtship of China, initiated to exert influence and
leverage in dealing with the Soviets may develop into a
marriage that, in the future, could jeopardize rather than
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V. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
While no doubt remains that within the Chinese military
and political leadership the debate continues over the
specific pace and emphasis to be placed on the modernization
of its military forces, a general decision has already been
made that Mao's doctrine of People's War is no longer an
adequate prescription for meeting the new Four Modernization
goals. The new regime apparently has shifted its primary
reliance on manpower and motivation to accept not only the
requirement for a nuclear deterrent, but also the necessity
of having a conventional force with the capability of
deterrence based on mobility and firepower.
Having made that decision, the success of their military
modernization program is going to depend upon: 1) China's
political stability, 2) Maintenance of a positive military
image, and 3) Patience over a long period of time.
A. POLITICAL STABILITY
When one tries to forecast the future of China's current
modernization effort, they must always maintain an historical
perspective, since changes may not be permanent. It is true
that the current regime has achieved some things such as a
new economic plan, a new body of law, and a new corps of
leaders. The ability to accomplish some of these goals can
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be attributed to the political stability of the regime of Hua
and Deng. The ability of the current regime to maintain this
stability will determine whether or not China is to enjoy
similar success. The achievement of modernization depends
less on hardware than on the efficient functioning of govern-
mental and social processes. It requires that the various
parts of the system fit together, and that they be managed
in an adaptive and flexible way.
It is apparent from the recent political maneuvering at
the Fifth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee
of the Chinese Communist Party (which met on February 20, 1980)
that such a program is being conducted by Deng. He and the
moderates are stripping the leadership bodies of any opposi-
tion to their current modernization programs and replacing
them with supporters of their policies. Such a plan, accord-
ing to Deng, is necessary to insure continuity of thought
and the ultimate accomplishment of a Chinese-style moderniza-
tion.
B. MILITARY IMAGE
The success of the modernization of the military will
require that its positive image be preserved with the
populace of China. The current regime seems to recognize
this since the Political Department of the PLA has included
it as a requirement in the PLA Guidelines for Political Work
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in 1980. The current program calls for:
"... the army's glorious tradition of supporting
the government and cherishing the people and to
further improve relations between the army and the
government, and the army and the people. Efforts
must be made to conscientiously study and analyze
the new situations and the new problems which have
cropped up under the historical conditions with
regard to relations between the army and the govern-
ment, and the army and the people, to carry out
education on the purpose of the army and the tradi-
tion of supporting the government and cherishing
the people in light of the new situation and the
new problems, and to improve the fundamental atti-
tude of cadres and fighters toward local governments
and the people. . . . "1
This close relationship between the army and the people
must continue so that a symbiotic relationship remains. It
is clear that as industry and the economy become developed,
understanding and cooperation of the vast population will
be needed to meet the needs of the military.
C. TIME
Finally, the modernization of the PLA is going to take
a long time. Although it is one of the Four Modernizations,
Deng Xiaoping, himself, stated that greater priorities of
the country will be granted to the other three: agriculture,
civilian industry, and science and technology. Only by
achieving significant progress in these three areas can the
PLA expect to experience any real long-term growth in its
capability. From the preceding discussion, one can expect
that this will not occur in the near future.
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Therefore, over the next few years, we can expect small
selective purchases of advanced military equipment by the
Chinese. China will be looking for weapons which they can
2
adapt, improve upon, and manufacture. China has forsaken
a quick-fix option, and will modernize the PLA slowly-
relying on Western European arms suppliers and the United
States for its source of modern weapons and technology.
The Chinese leadership of today is aware of the necessary
role that modern weapons and techniques most play on the
contemporary battlefield, as evidenced by a quote from
Peking's theoretical journal, Red Flag :
"Our military thinking must tally with changing
conditions . If we treat and command a modern war in
the way we commanded a war in the 1930' s and ly40's,
we are bound to meet with a big rebuff and suffer a
serious defeat. "3
It has also been shown that leadership recognizes the
necessity of receiving support from outside China if it
intends to have its military modernization program ful-
filled.
Rapprochement between the United States and China at
present appears to be the "pot of gold" at the end of the
rainbow following a violent storm. It is true that China's
recent detente with the West has greatly served the interests
of both sides, particularly in light of the recent events in
Afghanistan. China's opportunity has mitigated the effects
of the Soviet Union's growing strategic dominance and its
115

effect on the world's balance of power. It is evident that
the tilt toward strengthing the military relationship between
the United States and China at present is a parallel action
that serves the interests of both countries. The Soviets
can not help but realize and recognize that both the United
States and China share an interest in improving the balance
of power in East Asia.
One must also keep in mind the possibility that the United
States will not always enjoy a more intimate bond with China
than with the Soviet Union. The U.S. must formulate policies
allowing for harmony between all three countries, whatever
the degree of closeness in their relationship, as they all
say they are working for future peace and stability in the
entire East Asian region.
For the foreseeable future, the United States should
approach its military relations with China, specifically
arms transfers, with extreme caution. It should, however,
continue to maintain its stance of deterrence against the
Soviet Union, and be prepared for a similar power of deter-
rence should changes occur in the PRC-U.S.S.R. relationship.
This also allows China time to reestablish a better economic
and industrial base, and time to produce more of its own
military hardware (with assistance from the United States
and Western Europe)
.
This would seem to negate the possibility that China would
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adopt procedures or policies which would be inimical to the
interests of the United States in the future. Even-handed
treatment of the Soviet Union and China in the early 1980 's
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Demands to accelerate modernization clash with
demands to reduce military expenditures.
Continued modernization at relatively protracted
pace, increasing attention to politicization and
domestic role of PLA.
Emphasis on politicization to accompany Great
Leap Forward.
Objections to excessive politicization.
Under Lin Piao, attention to domestic role of PLA;
continued protracted modernization and develop-
ment of nuclear weapons.
Emphasis on domestic role - "leam from PLA"
campaign.
Demands for crash program of defense preparations
including reduction in domestic activities of PLA
to counter American escalation in Vietnam.
Deeper involvement of PLA in domestic activities
as Cultural Revolution begins; precautions to
reinforce defense and deterrence postures.
Preoccupation with maintaining or restoring
domestic order.
Attempts to bring domestic and strategic roles
to better balance. 1





Gang of Four attack military modernization and
stress resurgence of political activities.
Stress economic development; attempt to improve
PLA training, doctrine & organization takes place. 2
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